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Welcome to my philosophy page. In recent years , a community of interlinked approaches in
philosophy and psychology has emerged, known by such labels as situated cognition,
constructivism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) and corporeal
intersubjectivity. Representatives of these overlapping approaches such as Francisco Varela
(autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe,
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Alva Noe and Thomas
Fuchs(enactive, embodied('4EA') cognition), John Protevi(Deleuzian biopolitics) and Jan Slaby
(critical neuroscience) purport to have assimilated the central phenomenological insights of
Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and Eugene Gendlin concerning such matters as the nature of
affectivity, intersubjectivity and temporality. I argue in the following papers, however, that
Derrida, Heidegger, Husserl, Gendlin and George Kelly interpret the concept of temporality in a
radical manner that embodied enactivist writers like Gallagher, Zahavi, Ratcliffe, Thompson and
Fuchs fail to take into account in their readings of phenomenology. As a result , the latter's
accounts of affectivity, intentionality, empathy and intersubjectivity remain burdened by
traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal phenomenologies of Heidegger, Gendlin et
al put into question.
TOWARD A NEW ERA IN THINKING
A Phenomenological Critique of Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality
Abstract:
Matthew Ratcliffe's model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with
perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view
psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective
propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications
within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In
doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which
determinations of meaning and significance are relative to the changing structural coherence of
felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. And yet, from the phenomenological
vantages of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe's approach retains the
metaphysical presupposition of subject-object dualism as interacting bodies, with a separate
causative glue necessary to provide for the means of their relation. Ratcliffe re-purposed
Damasio's concept of background feeling and dressed it up in the garb of phenomenology , but it
remains a reciprocal causal model of psychological function. What Heidegger's
Being-in-the-World, Merleau-Ponty's figure-background structure of corporeal inter-subjectivity,
Gendlin's implicit intricacy and Husserl's reduced transcendental ego have in common is a
radicalized notion of temporality that overcomes the split between subject and object informing
Ratcliffe's understanding of being 'immersed in' and connected to a world, and thus abandons the
need to posit bodily feeling as a 'glue' organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of
consciousness of a world. Temporality , not the empirically causal body, provides the basis of
affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning.
Read the full paper at
https://www.academia.edu/42097007/A_Phenomenological_Critique_of_Existential_Feeling_Af
fect_as_Temporality
A Phenomenological Critique of Mindfulness
Abstract:
In The Embodied Mind, Varela and Thompson assert that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger's phenomenologies produce 'after the fact' theoretical reflections that miss the richness
of immediate concrete pre-reflective experience as present in the here-and-now. But Varela and
Thompson's separating of being and becoming in their empirical approach leads them to misread
these phenomenologists, and as a result to mistakenly give preference to mindfulness approaches
which fall short of the radicality of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Varela and Thompson follow
Husserl's method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired concepts associated with a
naive belief in the independence of subject and object. They don't complete the reduction though,
allowing subject and object to occupy separate moments. Varela and Thompson succeed in
reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still find it necessary to
ground intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering objectivities (the "arising
and subsiding, emergence and decay" of transitional forms which inhere in themselves for a
moment before relating to an outside). Varela and Thompson found the affectively, valuatively
felt contingency of particular acts of other-relatedness in what they presume to be a primordial
neutral point of pre-reflective conscious auto-affective awareness. But the phenomenologists
show that attention, as a species of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing.
Attention is affectively, valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as
co-participant in the synthesis, creation, constitution of objects of regard. As auto-affection turns
reflexively back toward itself, what it finds is not the normative sameness and constancy of a
neutral positivity(blissful, selfless compassion and benevolence toward all phenomena) but a
newly sensing being. Mindful self-reflexivity, expecting to find only what it put there, instead is
confronted with the self-displacement of its being exposed to and affected by an other. The basis
of our awareness of a world isn't simply compassionate, empathic relational co-determinacy, but
the motivated experience of disturbing CHANGE in relational co-determinacy.
Husserl's Challenge to Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Intersubjectivity
Abstract:
 In this paper, I show how Husserl, via the method of the epoche, dissolves Merleau-Ponty's
starting point in the gestalt structuralism of primary corporeal intersubjectivity, revealing a more
radically temporal foundation that has nothing of gestalt form in it. Whereas for Merleau-Ponty,
the dependency of the parts belonging to a whole is a presupposed unity, for Husserl, a whole
instantiates a temporal story unfolding each of its parts out of the others
associatively-synthetically as the furthering of a continuous progression or enrichment of sense.
As a consequence of the deconstruction of the gestalt, Husserl's notion of the foreign must be
understood in different terms than that of corporeal otherness. He offers an otherness to self that
manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose self-similarity presupposes and is built
from this irreducible foreignness. This is not a privileging the same over the different , but rather
a situating of the binary in a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship
than that of corporeal embodiment.
The Meaning of Feeling: Heidegger Against Embodied Cognition(Joshua Soffer,2006)
Abstract:
This article(Janus Head 2008) suggests how, with the aid of Derrida, Heidegger and Eugene
Gendlin, we may take a bold step beyond current embodied cognitive approaches in psychology,
and effectively challenge the phenomenological thinking of Merleau-Ponty.
Abstract: Current approaches in psychology have replaced the idea of a centralized, self-present
identity with that of a diffuse system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as
psychologically embodied and socially embedded. However, the failure of contemporary
perspectives to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts
of a psycho-bio-social organization may result in the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate
process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part. In this paper I show how
Heidegger, Derrida and Gendlin help us think from this more intimate process to transform
current views of metaphor, the unconscious, and the relation between affect and cognition.
Where Is The Social?A Critique of Social Constructionism)
Abstract:
This paper critiques, with the help of Derrida and Gendlin, social constructionism's (Kenneth
Gergen, John Shotter, Foucault) explanation of the basis of the social and of language, not by
championing one of the current embodied cognitive psychologies, but by offering a way of
thinking which transcends the limitations of both social constructionism and today's embodied
cognitive approaches. (Revision of my article in 'Theory and Psychology'(V11/5/2001)).
Heidegger and Derrida on Structure, Form and State
Abstract: 
Writers endorsing a general account of meaning as non-recuperable or non-coincidental from one
instantiation to the next may nonetheless treat the heterogeneous contacts between instants of
experience as transformations of fleeting forms, states, logics, structures, outlines, surfaces,
presences, organizations, patterns, procedures, frames, standpoints. When thought as pattern, the
structural- transcendental moment of eventness upholds a certain logic of internal relation; the
elements of the configuration mutually signify each other and the structure presents itself as a
fleeting identity, a gathered field. The particularity of eventness is not allowed to split the
presumed (temporary) identity of the internal configuration that defines the structure as structure.
History would be the endless reframing of a frame, the infinite shifting from paradigm to
paradigm. Heidegger and Derrida argue instead that in their essence, Beings don't HAVE
structure or constitution. There is no such THING as a form, a structure, a state. There is no
trans-formation but rather a trans-differentiation, (transformation without form, articulation as
dislocation) What is being transcended is not form but difference.
Heidegger, Will to Power and Gestell
Abstract:
 For Heidegger Nietzsche is the last metaphysician because he determines truth in relation to the
establishment of value-scheme. Heidegger argues that beginning from schematism and its
overcoming is starting too late. Starting from beings as value-structures turns Will to Power itself
into a value, the highest value. What Nietzsche fails to do is think from WITHIN, that is , AS the
supposed self-presencing lingering of the schematism. The fore-structuring gesture of
transcendence is not what goes beyond schematism, or before it as its condition of possibility, but
what is 'built into' it, what happens IN the 'is', AS the 'is.
Reading Heidegger Against Levinas
Abstract: 
A prevalent interpretation of Heidegger today is what I will call for the sake of convenience, the
Levinasian reading. According to this perspective, Heidegger's Being as Ontological Difference
grapples with the contradiction between the subjectivism of representationality and the absolute
other to representation. But the concept of Being as Ontological difference risks being mistaken
for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Derrida argues that the Levinas reading
mistakes the ontic for the ontological. Being is not a concept, the ontological difference is not the
difference between the subjective and the empirical, but difference WITHIN the subjective and
the empirical.
Reading Derrida against Jean-Luc Nancy
Abstract: 
Jean-Luc Nancy would appear to have avoided the aura of conceptual determinativeness plaguing
John Caputo's reading of Derrida. His rendering of the interweaving of experience is vigilant at
depriving us of the ability to capture and possess a temporary presence in the event itself. In
'Elliptical Sense' (Research in Phenomenology,pp.175-190) and `Differance' (Sense of the World,
pp.34-36) he thinks Derrida's quasi-transcendental as a being-singular-plural. But is Nancy's
differential communication of events understanding itself as Derridean differance? Nancy
himself reminds (Ellipsis34) that while there is a great proximity between his work and Derrida,
it is not a complicity. What might Nancy not be apprehending of Derrida's thought?
Reading Derrida Against Geoffrey Bennington
Abstract:
One may locate in Geoffrey Bennington's reading of Derrida a formalization of deconstructive
terms reminiscent of Caputo's thematizing of the moment of the sign. In Bennington's hands,
Derrida's differance seems to be thought as a conceptual form programmatically configuring
subjective, or `actual', events. Bennington reads Derrida's possible-impossible hinge, the
`perhaps', as pertaining to definitive events which either conform to convention or break away
from those norms. Bennington's quasi-transcendental, in thinking itself via the pure structurality
of internal relation, unknowingly succumbs to a deconstructive destabilization before it can even
think the first instance of its own `contingently realized' form. An internally unitary principle or
form, even if thought only in the instant of its contingent application to an empirical event,
cannot justify its momentary identicality, and so the supposed determinativeness of the event as
the `as such' of its internal structure is revealed as a phantasm repressing a more intimate effect.
Reading Derrida Against John Caputo
Abstract:
 If for Caputo the universality of desire as self-appropriation and the singularity of the gift as
desire-beyond-desire depend on and interweave with each other, they nevertheless do so as the
communication between discrete and separable moments, that of the `sensible, rational circle of
time' and the `exceeding and surpassing of ourselves'. The subject for Caputo seems to function
as the temporary self-identity of construct. It is the "desire for restitution, fulfillment,
reappropriation, well being". This agent-subject "always intends to act for its own good". He says
without this willing well-being "the subject/agent would never do a thing, nothing would happen
or eventuate". Caputo's equating of the subject with a moment of re-appropriation ( he says
`making an exhibit of ourselves', but can we make an exhibit of ourselves without unintentionally
exiting from ourselves?) exemplifies the attempt to retain a remnant of a structuralist center as
only the instant of contingency itself. In so doing, Caputo reifies what Derrida puts into question.
What Is A Number: Re-Thinking Derrida's Concept of Infinity
Abastract:
 Iterability, the repetition which alters the idealization it reproduces, is the engine of
deconstructive movement. The fact that all experience is transformative-dissimulative in its
essence does not, however, mean that the momentum of change is the same for all situations.
Derrida adapts Husserl's distinction between a bound and a free ideality to draw up a contrast
between mechanical mathematical calculation, whose in-principle infinite enumerability is
supposedly meaningless, empty of content, and therefore not in itself subject to alteration through
contextual change, and idealities such as spoken or written language which are directly animated
by a meaning-to-say and are thus immediately affected by context. Derrida associates the dangers
of cultural stagnation, paralysis and irresponsibility with the emptiness of programmatic,
mechanical, formulaic thinking. This paper endeavors to show that enumerative calculation is not
context-independent in itself but is instead immediately infused with alteration, thereby making
incoherent Derrida's claim to distinguish between a free and bound ideality. Along with the
presumed formal basis of numeric infinitization, Derrida's non-dialectical distinction between
forms of mechanical or programmatic thinking (the Same) and truly inventive experience (the
absolute Other) loses its justification. In the place of a distinction between bound and free
idealities is proposed a distinction between two poles of novelty; the first form of novel
experience would be characterized by affectivites of unintelligibility, confusion and vacuity, and
the second by affectivities of anticipatory continuity and intimacy. This is the first chapter of my
book, 'Sense and Affect', (available online below) introducing a philosophy after Derrida.
______________________________________________________________________________
____________
SENSE AND AFFECT
My book Sense and Affect (2002) exposes the limits of important recent strands in continental
philosophy. It questions the necessity of a certain language of violence, otherness, disruption and
pathos saturating Jacques Derrida's texts and the texts of those having a proximity to Derrida's
deconstructionist project. This book establishes a connection between such affective terminology
and a common, if heterogeneously expressed, theoretical inadequacy binding Derrida and writers
such as Heidegger, Foucault, Caputo and Nancy. Their failure to penetrate a presumed
irreducibility of suffering in the world is shown to be linked to their dependence on the
assumption of an irreducible tension at the origin of meaning. This book develops a fresh method
of thought thoroughly unraveling the presuppositions of deconstructive orientations and
uncovering a finer silt of the world than is seen via such discourses.
Download PDF of Sense and Affect from my academia.edu page
***********************************************************************
A Phenomenological Critique of Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality
Abstract:
Matthew Ratcliffe's model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with
perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view
psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective
propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications
within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In
doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which
determinations of meaning and significance are relative to the changing structural coherence of
felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. And yet, from the phenomenological
vantages of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe's approach retains the
metaphysical presupposition of subject-object dualism as interacting bodies, with a separate
causative glue necessary to provide for the means of their relation. Ratcliffe re-purposed
Damasio's concept of background feeling and dressed it up in the garb of phenomenology , but it
remains a reciprocal causal model of psychological function. What Heidegger's Being-in-the
-World, Merleau-Ponty's figure-background structure of corporeal inter-subjectivity, Gendlin's
implicit intricacy and Husserl's reduced transcendental ego have in common is a radicalized
notion of temporality that overcomes the split between subject and object informing Ratcliffe's
understanding of being 'immersed in' and connected to a world, and thus abandons the need to
posit bodily feeling as a 'glue' organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of
consciousness of a world. Temporality , not the empirically causal body, provides the basis of
affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning.
Introduction
Matthew Ratcliffe's model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with
perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view
psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective
propositional frameworks in which affect is either peripheral to cognitive processes or only
directed toward internal bodily feeling. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective
reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal
world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which
determinations of meaning and significance are oriented by the changing structural coherence of
world-directed felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction.
The aim of this paper is to show that while Ratcliffe's existential feeling significantly transforms
Damasio's concept of background feeling, in dressing it up in the garb of phenomenological
philosophical conceptions, he neglects to follow Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger
in establishing a radicalized concept of temporality as the ground of affectivity. Whereas the
above phenomenologists fuse affect and intention within the moment of time itself as tripartite
structure of temporal becoming, Ratcliffe founds affect and intention as distinguishable structural
aspects of a reciprocally causal model . As a result, Ratcliffe substitutes polarizing ,
semi-arbitrary conditionings for a more intimate, intricate and unitary process of
affective-connative meaning creation.
Existential Feeling as Global Situatedness:
In the early 2000's Ratcliffe introduced the outlines of what was to become his model of
existential feelings, incorporating elements of Damasio's background feeling.
" According to Damasio, background feelings are ever-present, although ordinarily tacit. They
serve to structure the everyday ways in which we encounter the world, the basic ways in which
we find ourselves in the world:Ratcliffe 2002, p.298) Damasio wrote:". . . I am postulating
another variety of feeling which I suspect preceded the others in evolution. I call it background
feeling because it originates in "background" body states rather than in emotional states. It is not
the Verdi of grand emotion, nor the Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist
in tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being." (1995, p. 150)
Ratcliffe fleshed out his approach with elements drawn from the phenomenologies of
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger:
"Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty add that localized experiences of possibility presuppose a
more-enveloping orientation, a sense of belonging to the world. When I see or think about
something, when I am afraid of something, and when I am in a bad mood about a wider situation,
I already find myself in the world, in a way than differs in kind from intentional experiences in
one or another modality (e.g. imagining, perceiving, or remembering something). This 'world' is
presupposed by intentional states of whatever kind with whatever content. We can think of it in
terms of a possibility space, a receptivity to types of possibility.""Things are experienced as
significant to us, as mattering to us, in various different ways, something that involves a sense of
the possibilities they offer." (Ratcliffe, 2020)
"...what Heidegger in Being and Time calls 'Being-in-the-world' is exactly what we gain
reflective access to by performing the phenomenological reduction...This conveys much the same
broad conception of 'world' that we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty:...something that we are
already practically, unreflectively immersed in when we experience something, think about it or
act upon it." These globally structured patterns of existential feeling amount to " 'ways of finding
oneself in the world'. As such, they are what we might call 'pre-intentional', meaning that they
determine the kinds of intentional states we are capable of adopting, amounting to a 'shape' that
all experience takes on." (Ratcliffe 2015)
The Affective 'glue' organizing existential feeling:
If for Ratcliffe, a global structure of feeling orients the significance for us of the objects and
persons we interact with in the world, how is this structure organized and sustained? What is the
'glue' that holds it together? Ratcliffe's causal reinforcement-based model of affect assigns it the
role of biasing appraisal via selectively guiding attention toward a heightening or lowering of
perceived significance of various world events. The role of affective attunement is to produce
"changes in the types of significant possibility to which one is receptive'. (Ratcliffe 2016)
"...existential feelings determine the kinds of noetic and noematic feelings that one is open to.
"...the existential feeling sets the parameters for the kinds of more localized experience one is
capable of having."(2016). "Emotions "tune us to the world, making it relevant to us by opening
up certain possibilities for explicit deliberation and closing off others. "(Ratcliffe 2002)
Bodily dispositions can actively direct one toward salient objects in one's world, but are "equally
implicated in feeling unable to act upon something. Passivity in the face of threat may involve
inclinations to withdraw, to retreat, along with the absence of any other salient possibilities."
(Ratcliffe 2015). For instance, in depression one cannot find the motivation to act to change one's
situation ( a confident 'I can' becomes 'I can't'). Solipsistic self-perpetuating narratives, reinforced
and organized by feelings of avoidance and reduced salience, tell one why they shouldn't or can't
connect with others.
" In any experience, only certain possibilities are offered up and only some of these appear
especially salient. According to both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the possibilities that show up
are constituted by bodily dispositions. These dispositions shape all experience and show up as
potentialities that belong to objects. The different ways in which the body responds to things
amount to different systems of concrete possibilities. "(Ratcliffe 2010)
In order to situate Ratcliffe's orientation relative to the phenomenologists whose ideas he
incorporates, it is helpful to see how he makes use of Damasio's neuroscience-inspired theorizing
on the relations of affect and intention.
"...emotions play a role in constraining and structuring the realm of explicit deliberation,
restricting deliberation to a small number of options and structuring patterns of reasoning, so that
we remain focused and relevant in our activities, able to act towards goals without becoming
distracted by trivia. Thus emotions and feelings serve to constrain and focus our attention, so that
we only consider from a pre-structured set of options. Damasio's (1995, 1996) more specific
hypothesis is that emotions are cognitively mediated body states. He christens this theory the
"somatic marker hypothesis". The idea is that somatic (body) signals are associated with
perceptual stimuli, either as a result of innate or learned neural connections, and thus "mark"
those stimuli. Different perceptions can be associated with various kinds of body states, which
may serve as alarm signals or, alternatively, as enticing invitations. According to Damasio, a
complex of such signals focuses and structures our cognitive interactions with the world. Once
we incorporate complex learned associations between perceptions and body states, a vast web of
somatic markers can develop. These signals serve to eliminate certain possibilities, which feel
bad, from a choice set and focus deliberation upon other feel good signals. Thus cognition is
constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that
manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body
states."(Ratcliffe 2002)
Slaby provides this useful elaboration of how bodily feeling can be world-oriented:
" feeling bad emotionally (as opposed to feeling bad due to physical illness or injury) is not a
disembodied, intellectual appreciation of things going badly - although it surely is some kind of
appreciation of things going badly. It is also and essentially a bodily experience. If you are angry
and feel offended by your colleague, you have a self-disclosing bodily feeling. It is not easy to
describe it exactly, but I think you have the physical impression of being "pushed down", of
being literally "oppressed" by an external force. In this way, emotional pain is essentially bodily.
Its bodily nature is not a separable "aspect" that is merely added on to an otherwise purely
intellectual appreciation of what's going on; rather, it is the very core of the painful emotional
experience. "(Slaby 2008)
Let me encapsulate Ratcliffe's perspective on the role of affect in determining the ways that the
world can make sense to us. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are "'incorporated as
essential components in cognition", but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical;
"...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of
cognition"(Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from
outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and emotion can "override cognitive
judgement"(p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran's clinical observations of individuals with
anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally
generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe attribute this behavior to damage to connections
between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically
functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch
large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances where weaker percepts from
the environment cannot.
It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe , intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but
emotion, as conditioning valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. He is
apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what he thinks of as intentional thought to
de-center thinking processes, because he treats cognition as tending to form temporarily
self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So
he relies on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled
cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of
emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and
meaning.
(FOOTNOTE: For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the
interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an
ongoing context. Ratcliffe(2002) cites Ramachandran's account of individuals with Capgras
syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously
experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)
Ratcliffe(2002) asserts: "Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent
interpretation of events..."(p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably
linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between
pre-existing states than a more radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling
originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action
readiness circuits that, Panksepp(1998) claims, are "completely biological and affective but...,
through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become]
inextricably mixed with learning and world events"(p.303)
For all their differences, Ratcliffe shares with other contemporary accounts of affect and emotion
what I call the 'adaptationist' presumption that meaning is shaped in a semi-arbitrary way by
inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside. I don't think Ratcliffe's model of
affectivity has abandoned the naturalist pre-suppositions animating Damasio's (2000) claim:
"...as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades
eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and
objects in our autobiographical experience"(p.54). According to this thinking, physiological
processes of feeling adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment,
authorizing adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins. Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is
linked to a milieu outside of itself (cognition) and with which the logic of the bond is indirect,
partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case
with nonadaptive mutations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant
aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally.
Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.
Husserl's Transcendental Affect
Ratcliffe insists that affectivity and intentionality are inseparable, And yet, it is significant that he
still finds it coherent to imagine what a situation might be like in which affect was absent from
our experience of the world.
"...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and 'lighting up' aspects of the world in such a
way as to call forth actions and thoughts. Without the world-structuring orientation that they
provide, we are disoriented, cut off from the world, which no longer solicits thoughts and actions
and is consequently devoid of value. In effect, [William] James is saying that our very sense of
reality is constituted by world-orienting feelings that bind us to things ." (Ratcliffe 2005)
" The absence of emotion comprises a state of cognitive and behavioural paralysis rather than
fully functional cognition, stripped of 'mere' affect. A phenomenology without affect is a
phenomenology that guts the world of all its significance. he experienced world is ordinarily
enriched by the feelings that we sew into it, that imbue it with value and light it up as an arena of
cognitive and behavioural possibilities. So cognition without affect is not, according to James, in
any sense complete. It is an extreme phenomenological privation that strips the world of all
meaning, a state of depression or 'melancholia'. In such a state, James describes how 'the world
now looks remote, strange, sinister, uncanny. Its color is gone, its breath is cold, there is no
speculation in the eyes it glares with'" (James 1902: p. 151), (Ratcliffe 2005).
Slaby concurs: "Nothing but "neutral states of intellectual perception" would remain, as William
James famously put it, when we "try to abstract from consciousness [of an emotion] all the
feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms" (James 1884, 193)." "Not all human experience is
clearly marked as hedonic, and so not all human experience is affective. "(Slaby 2008)
In sum, the experienced world without affect is an 'extreme privation', a world of paralysis,
meaninglessness, disorientation. Even if Ratcliffe conjures the idea of affectless cognition only as
a purely hypothetical thought experiment or limit case, the fact that he can associate any qualities
at all with such a world indicates that he is operating from a concept of affect that does not treat
it as a philosophical a priori. But what would such a philosophically grounding approach to affect
look like? Imagine that instead of hypothesizing awareness without affect, we were to place time
out of bounds. It is immediately clear that any attempt to describe the qualitative features of one's
experience of such a world (meaningless, paralyzed, disoriented, etc) would be pointless, since
without time there could be no awareness and no world. If we were to re-construe affect in such a
way that it became as irreducible to experience as time, then it would no longer be a matter of
deriving feeling, mood, emotion and other forms of affectivity from adaptive patterns of
contingent interactive bodily and interpersonal schemes, but of locating their origin in the basis
of being itself. This is what Husserl attempted with his model of temporal constitution.
Husserl's grounding of affectivity in temporality is a transcendental grounding, not a naturalistic
one. Underlying and founding all strata of bodily and interpersonal dynamics is the assimilative
basis of temporal constitution as retention, primal impression and protention. This is Husserl's
primordial pre-condition for any world , any being. The subjective and objective sides of the
structure of temporal synthesis are not separate entities but only poles of a single act of
intentional sense. In this synthesis, both the subject and the object pole contribute their own
quality of feeling to what 'an object is for the subject' in its valuative , affective sense. The
energetic dynamism of feeling isn't something added to a content of perception from outside of it,
in causal relation with it as agent of reinforcement. Meaning content implies its own affective
force, the affective signature is intrinsic to the objective and subjective sides. This is what
constitutes the 'life' in what Husserl calls the living present. The affective qualities contributed by
the objective pole (noema) are its vivacity. Husserl describes the affective allure contributed by
the objective pole as "that varying vivacity of a lived experience, of a datum of
consciousness."(Passive and Active Synthesis, p.214)
And an affective signature is intrinsic to the subject, in the form of desires, tendencies, strivings,
anticipations, aimed at the objective pole. As Husserl says, there are rays emanating from
subjective side to the objective side and vice-versa. Both affects originating on the subjective
side and those originating on the objective side are implied in all intentional meaning. The
always present affective qualities of the object (beautiful, pleasurable, unpleasant) are not made
thematic in objectivating acts (perceiving a spatial object), but they are in valuative acts. And
one's affective, hedonic attitude toward the object of an intention (disappointed, depressed,
elated, bored, frightened) may not be thematized in theoretical interest, but will appear in our
practical attitude toward the world.
Husserl's starting point in the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness is
already a self-othering, thus an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity,
prior to any configurational-corporeal constitution. Natural bodily structures are not the basis of
affect for Husserl. If one wants to still talk about a body, what remains of the body for Husserl
once one has dug beneath all the sedimented layers of constituted meaning, would be the 'body'
of the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness. This is already a self-othering,
thus an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity, prior to any
configurational-corporeal constitution, prior to any empirically defined physiological or
psychological structures, prior to human beings, but presupposed by them. Affect is not an
evolutionary device, it is synonymous with entity, being, existence, object, subject. Being as the
moment of experience is simultaneously the feeling of being affected and the feeling of
anticipatory striving. These precede the notion of a body as biological organism, and instead is a
pre-condition for being of any sort. Feeling, understood most primordially, is simply movement
(not in empirical but subjective space), transition, becoming, time.
Footnote: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's (2011) grounding of affectivity in activity recalls Husserl,
but her rendering of it in terms of spatio-temporal movement and kinesthesia remains at the level
of empirical space and time and fails to ground feeling relative to more primordial notions of
internal temporality and spatiality common to Husserl, Gendlin, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.
Husserl introduces a a primordial motivational principle in which noetic anticipatory assimilation
dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. This means that the capacity of
experiences to delight or disturb us, particularly when it comes to profoundly self-affecting
valuative concerns, is much more a function of the relation of the event to our strivings and
anticipations than it is to whatever qualitites of feeling (enticement, allure, vivacity) are
contributed by the object pole in itself.
If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency, a general striving toward
'possibilities' of fulfillment, characterizes at all levels Husserl's project, then we could justifiably
claim that he has this in common with Ratcliffe, whose approach also is oriented around
anticipatory temporality and possibilities. But it is not simply that Husserl claims protention as a
general going beyond itself of one's experience of an object, rather that this going beyond itself
has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency. We strive to assimilate experiences. We
see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective
achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relationality,
correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective 'mineness', variations, flowing multiplicities,
congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality,
alienation there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a
thematics (which are already associative syntheses of variations on variations) for Husserl , a
similarity-in-difference.
Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a "universal drive intentionality
(TreibintentionalitÃ¤t)." Experience is being affected and changed by what one anticipatorily
aims at through striving. As Bernet says " this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply
an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal."( Bernet 2010,
p.16). Striving as desire "is striving after, or driving away from, shunning, that is, it has its
positivity and negativity.""Its fulfillment is a relaxation that results from realizing [the striving,
etc.], in the change into the corresponding joy of fulfillment." On the other hand, because
"expectations can really only be fulfilled through perceptions, they are also essentially
susceptible to disappointment in all circumstances." "...something new can be a slap in the face to
all expectation." (Husserl 1989)
How does this anticipatory receptivity on the part of the subjective, or Ego pole of experience
compare with Ratcliffe's claim that bodily felt dispositions constrain and orient our receptivity to
the world? Ratcliffe explains:
"I have argued - drawing on the work of Husserl (1989), amongst others - that experience of
worldly possibilities is inextricable from a sense of bodily dispositions... loss of enticing
possibilities from the world is bound up with a lethargic body that is not stirred into action by its
surroundings. Again and again, first-person reports by psychiatric patients convey pervasive
experiential changes, where an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how
the world appears and in how one relates to it. "
The dependence of our perceptions on bodily dispositions that Ratcliffe credits Husserl for
revealing to us is a correlation that appears when we are approaching the world within the natural
attitude. It represents that stratum of constitution within which the world opens up for us in terms
of physical objects, subjective sensations, and casual relations between the psychical and the
physical. Included within this naturalistic stratum of thinking are psychophysical relations
intertwining my feeling sensate body with my felt physical body. Ratcliffe's account of bodily felt
dispositions as a complex of learned associations between perceptions and body states belongs to
this natural causal stratum. However, Husserl asserts that making sense of intersubjective
experiences such as affect, feeling, valuation, emotion and mood requires a shift from the natural
attitude to what he calls the personal or spiritual attitude. Within this higher stratum, natural
causation is replaced by intentional motivation.
"...when we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, that is to be understood as the subject of
intentionality, and we see that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit."" The"
because-so" of motivation has a totally different sense than causality in the sense of
nature."(Ideas II, p. 231)
My bodily felt dispositions lose their character as causal conditionings when I relate to the world
as a valuing, intending social participant, and instead are fused with and subordinated to the
motivated valuative intentionalities driven by the dynamics of my social interactions. Only when
I shift back to the natural attitude do mood dispositions appear for me again in terms of causal
bodily feelings and sensations (lethargic, constricted, closed off, energized, aroused, etc). But
noticing 'how my body feels' only contributes to the elucidation of intentional moods when
transferred from the naturalistic to the personalistic sphere as a metaphor. For example, my
personalistic sense of my depression infuses and animates my feeling of bodily lethargy with the
corresponding affective intentional meaning of feeling 'down in the dumps'. Without this
interpretive animation coming from the higher intentional stratum, fusing with and lending
metaphorical significance to the bodily data, my corporeal sensations of lethargy would bear no
direct relevance to my being in the world as depressed. No pattern of organization of causally
intertwined perception and corporeal feeling would ever be able turn bodily sensations like
generic lethargy into intentionally significant moods, values or emotions.
"To be sure, I find the stratum of sensation to be localized in the Body, including therefore
physical pleasure and physical pain; but that only shows that this stratum does not belong to the
realm of what properly pertains to the Ego." (Husserl, Ideas II p.223)
"...in my theoretical, emotional, and practical behavior-in my theoretical experience and thinking,
in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, desiring, wanting-l feel myself
conditioned by the matter in question, though this obviously does not mean psychophysically
conditioned... For this realizing apprehension, the psychophysical relations do not play,
obviously, any actual essential role. I apprehend myself as dependent in my behavior, in my acts,
on the things themselves, on their beautiful color, on their special form, on their pleasant or
dangerous properties. I do not therein apprehend myself as dependent on my Body or on my
history." (Ideas II p.148)
Husserl allows that an intention can address and modify a more or less global background of
pragmatic valuative concerns, or else be confined to only one detail of experience. A perceptual
object can appear in its normal shape and color, but feel unreal or unenticing when we are
depressed. The affective and valuative aspects most narrowly associated with a perception do not
reflect one's depressed state because they are not directly implicated in the global changes in ones
comportment toward the world ,whereas higher strata of valuative feelings related to ones
interpersonal engagements and expectations are directly affected. The key point is that the
integrated structure of experience is such for Husserl that both higher and lower strata of
valuative intentional constitution are engaged in such globally self-implicating experiences as
depression and grief. Mood and emotion do not shape or condition as causal reinforcements, but
instead express the relative anticipatory integrity of motivated position takings, drawing on a
habitual history of valuative position-takings.
The constitution of intentional sense pertaining to one aspect of one's life does not occur in
isolation from all other aspects of one's mental processes. For Husserl, the anticipatory nature of
intentionality provides mental processes with a hierarchicizing organizational tendency. As
Husserl puts it, a part demands a whole. And larger wholes demand even larger wholes within
which to associate themselves in intentional syntheses. Relatively trivial perceptual meanings are
motivated and framed in relation to more subordinate concerns and these are motivationally
oriented in relation to ones most important self-involving goals . Experiences such as severe
depression have their encompassing effects by virtue of the interlocking organization of meaning
implications. Depression is a sweeping disappointment and loss at the highest, most integrative
level of anticipative self-regard in relation to the interpersonal world.
The fact that Husserl's starting point is transcendental does not mean that a naturalized account of
affect like that of Ratcliffe could not complement Husserl's a priori one. I don't mean to enter into
a debate concerning whether insights of phenomenological philosophies of authors such as
Husserl and Heidegger can be naturalized. There is no one notion of the natural. The history of
empiricism is a genealogy of changing philosophies of the empirical and the natural. Eugene
Gendlin's process model is an example of a naturalistic approach which accords in many ways
with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. My interest in this paper is to persuade that
Ratcliffe's particular naturalized interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger lacks a
core concept defining the latter's approaches, the fusion of affectivity, ,conation, intention and
temporality. The organization principle underlying Ratcliffe's natural model implies a different
philosophical ground than that of Husserl's, one more aligned with pragmatism and hermeneutics
( and the phenomenologies of Sartre, Scheler and Stein) than Husserl, Merleau-Ponty Heidegger
or Gendlin.
Husserl offers a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute alterity, the
subjective and the objective, the affective and the intentional, in the same intentional moment.
Husserl's general notion of affect, applying to such terms as emotion, feeling and desire as well,
determines that every experienced event of any kind (bodily-sensory, perceptual, conceptual,
practical-valuative ) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning
is an advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a
background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames the activity as a whole, as "a kind of
cradle within which cognition rests"(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296), but in that each moment of
engagement is an inseparable inter-bleeding between a prior context of attunement or thematics,
and a change in that attunement.
Heidegger on Attunement and Understanding:
In Heidegger's Befindlichkeit, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as attunement,
mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find the most thoroughgoing phenomenological
articulation of the inseparable relation of affect, intention and temporality. Temporality is the
well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. Temporality, the way the world
discloses itself to Dasein, is structured as the equi-primordial gestures of care, understanding,
attunement and discourse.
Since his earliest writings on background dispositions of feeling, Ratcliffe has used Heidegger's
Befindichkiet as a source of inspiration. But Heidegger follows Husserl in grounding the
orienting capacity of affective attunement in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a
schematic causal interaction between body states and meaning intentions. Ratcliffe writes:
"...a mood is not an intentional state but a condition of possibility for intentionality ." "According
to Heidegger, moods are not intentional states that encompass a wide range of objects. Rather,
they are modes of Befindlichkeit, ways of finding oneself in the world. This, he says, is
presupposed by the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities:
â ž: "The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes
it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something" (Heidegger, 1962, p.176/ 137). A
central characteristic of Befindlichkeit, in its various modes, is that it determines the ways in
which things can matter to us and, therefore, the kinds of intentional state we can adopt."
(Ratcliffe 2012)
There is a crucial difference between Ratcliffe's understanding of intention as directedness
toward an object and what Heidegger means when he talks about directing oneself toward
something. For Heidegger, 'directedness toward' does not mean connecting with a pre-existing
object in a propositional stance but constituting an 'object' from the synthesis of past , present and
future as a projective forehaving. This projective disclosing does not mean, as Ratcliffe seems to
think, an anticipation of possible happenings in the future. Ratcliffe says Heideggerian Care is
"the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and
forever looking to the future (projection)" (Ratcliffe 2002)). But the past, present and future don't
operate for Heidegger as distinct modes. They interpenetrate each other so completely that all
three are inseparably implicated in facticity, fallenness and projection. As Gendlin(1997b)
explains, "the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning.
This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed
by what it functions in"(p.37 ). What the past functions in comes toward Dasein from the future.
Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is,
is futural in its being in general." "Only because Da-sein in general IS as I AM-having-been, can
it come futurally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back." Thus, "Having been arises from
the future".(Being and Time, p.299)
Contra Ratcliffe, Heidegger differentiates his use of the word 'possibility' from a conventional
(and Husserl's), understanding of it :
"The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty,
logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that
can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet
real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than
reality and necessity. "(Being and Time p.135)
"Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement understands. " "...what is encountered in
the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the understanding of world." "'As
this understanding, it "knows" what is going on, that is, what its potentiality of being is. Da-sein
is not something objectively present which then has as an addition the ability to do something,
but is rather primarily being-possible. Da-sein is always what it can be and how it is its
possibility."(p.134)
The attuned understanding projecting itself upon possibilities is not a future possibility as a
hypothetical present that has not happened yet. A possibility is a relevant field of meaning
happening now as implicit, veiled, undifferentiated meaning . It is the present in the mode of
undifferentiated, implicit , but actually existing possibilities that the past has projected itself into
NOW. Explicit relations with equipment and other Da-seins emerge out of the implicit, veiled,
undifferentiated field of relevance which Heidegger calls a possibility.
"...what is encountered in the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the
understanding of world, a relevance which is made explicit by interpretation." "When something
is understood but still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation..." "the world which
has already been understood is interpreted. What is at hand comes explicitly before sight that
understands. "(Heidegger 2010)
Footnote: Slaby refers to his model of affect as 'radical situatedness' and yet shares Ratcliffe's
traditional, inauthentic understanding of affective temporality as causal dispositional state taking
place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided
into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and
the past as what is no longer now. Slaby says factual situatedness "is situatedness in a place and a
time, synchronic and diachronic". "Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the
form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing
comportment." " The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential
tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and
what is furthermore "out there," beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in
unforeseeable ways." (Slaby 2017).
This is an important point, because Heideggerian projection conveys the idea that the structure of
temporality marks each present experience, each 'NOW', as a global shift of existential feeling.
"Attunement is grounded in thrownness",... and, as thrown, Da-sein is thrown into the mode of
being of projecting." This means that each moment is a change in one's way of being in the
world. Even as moods maintain a loose ongoing thematic consistency over time, nevertheless
each interpretive moment of attuned understanding unravels and subtly but globally 'reframes the
frame'.
Affectivity is not an existential state (there are no actual states, frames, representations, schemas,
dispositions of existence for Heidegger, neither attuned nor intentional), not a background
orientation of mood that frames particular intentions and emotions as a whole, as "a kind of
cradle within which cognition rests"(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296) but simultaneously a change in
affectivity, sense and understanding which for Heidegger is nothing other than the experienced
equi-primordiality of the ecstasies of past present and future as the becoming of the NOW.
Attunement is disclosive, not as a pre-deliberative, pre-reflective evaluative backdrop to
intentional deliberation, a pre-given disposition as an already existing frame which shapes not yet
actual possibilities. It is self-changing projective being-assailed by the world , always in a new
way, every new moment, whose ongoing anticipatory continuity as 'this particular mood' is at the
same time a moment-to-moment self-reinvention born of thrownness. Being-affected always
totals, addresses and modifies all of ones prior experience. For both Heidegger and
Gendlin(whose work will be addressed later in this paper), the totality of one's past
pragmatic-valuative-affective comportment toward the world functions and changes as a single
unity, with all of its 'parts' always implying each other. One's comportment in fact only exists
through its being changed moment to moment as attunement-intention.
When Heidegger says that, in attunement, Dasein "is disclosed to itself before all cognition and
willing and beyond their scope of disclosure" this is not a validation of Ratcliffe's claim that
propositional intentionality is an activity oriented within and framed by mood. The distinction
Ratcliffe makes between existential and intentional structures of experience does not exist for
Heidegger. While attunement, as an ontological concept, is a more primordial notion than will or
cognition, it is not as if the latter simply act as variable moves within a more or less stable
orienting background situatedness .On the contrary, such ontic concepts as cognition, willing,
intending are inauthentic modes of 'letting things be encountered', and letting things be
encountered IS being affected or moved by them freshly moment to moment. In other words,
each intention as it appears subtly reinvents the attunement that it occurs into.
Against Heidegger's explicit determination of attunement as equi-primordial with discourse and
understanding , meaning that none of these modes has priority over the others in a valuative,
genetic or ontological sense, Ratcliffe wants to prioritize attunement.
"..it is mood that has primacy over understanding, as mood is responsible for determining the
kinds of possibility that are presupposed by understanding. What Heidegger calls "discourse "
(Rede ) similarly depends upon mood ." (Ratcliffe 2012)
We can see why it may be important for Ratcliffe to give mood a formative role that is not
accorded to understanding or discourse, based on what has been presented so far concerning his
distinction between existential feeling and intentionality, Briefly stated, Ratcliffe reads
Heidegger's account of attunement as akin to the role of existential feeling, a, global interactive
scheme composed of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and
body states. Understanding, as propositional intentionality, is a particular relational structure
within that orienting disposition. "...cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a
background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing
background of implicit representations of body states."(Ratcliffe 2002). Heidegger, in contrast,
explicitly warns against interpreting Understanding as the thematic propositional grasping of
intentional meaning, insisting that such a misreading "degrades it to the level of a given, intended
content."(Being and Time, p.145)
Intentionally directed experiences don't simply occur within the larger framework of a specific
attunement. As factical experiences of interpretation, they are themselves changes in our global
attunement. The mode of interpretation, which is where one can locate activities of perception,
intention and interpersonal interaction in general, is not a modality conforming to a specific
theme of significance of a prior attunement. As a development of understanding, it is a particular
way of changing ones attunement as a whole. Thus, if attuned understanding determines the
kinds of intentional meanings we are capable of adopting, then intentional meanings as they arise
in circumspective relevance out of previous ones reshape the kinds of attuned understanding we
are capable of having.
On the one hand, variation in modes of attunement is as continuous as time itself. On the other
hand, a thematic continuity holds for Dasein throughout its moment to moment global shifts in
sense and feeling such that relatively stable ongoing modes of comportment toward the world are
discernable. Ratcliffe believes he can prioritize attunement over understanding because, as we
have seen, his schematic feeling model begins from a split between the subjective (body feeling
state) and objective (perceptual and propositional intentional meaning) poles of experience. As a
result of this split, the affective and perceptual-conative components are treated as if they are
separate aspects in states of variable relationality. When bodily feeling states function to enhance
our engagement with the world, according to Ratcliffe, we experience ourselves more intimately
situated in the world. On the other hand, affective relevance ("the sense of being situated in a
world" (Existential Feeling 2017) can be profoundly diminished, leaving propositional
intentionality intact but devoid of adaptive orientation. One is still aware of a world moment to
moment, one still has perceptions and memories, and yet this world is denuded of felt relevance
and we are inclined to avoid social interaction. For instance, Ratcliffe claims that anxiety is
intrinsically 'alienating' or 'externalising'. It can alienate us from its objects (Ratcliffe and
Wilkinson 2016). Ratcliffe considers the most extreme cases of erosion of situatedness , of the
ability and capacity to experience types of possibility and to contemplate certain relevant options,
to be a form of decision-making impairment and incompetence (Ratcliffe, forthcoming).
Fernandenz, along with Ratcliffe, believes that psycho-pathologies like depression involve "a
general degradation in our ability to be affectively situated in and attuned to our world" and
perhaps even the complete loss of affective situatedness.
"... the degree to which one is attuned to and situated in a world through moods can itself
undergo change. .. Some cases of people diagnosed with depression are best understood not as an
erosion of a particular mood, or as the emergence of a new mood, but instead as an erosion of the
category of moods as a whole; that is to say, as an erosion of the structure of situatedness. "
"Alfred Kraus also characterizes melancholic depression as a loss of moods and feelings: "At its
core, the melancholic mood alteration is-paradoxically formulated-rather a lack of mood" (Kraus
2003, 208, Fernandez 2014)."
Ratcliffe's understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger's in a number of crucial ways.
First, unlike Heidegger's account, Ratciffe's Befindlichkiet is not an irreducible apriori of
affective experience, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily
and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for him is the achievement of a concatenating
process. When we delve beneath Ratcliffe's global schemes to locate the invariant and essential
condition of possibility of his feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally
casual model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived at this neo-Kantian 'apriori',
we are not yet in the vicinity of Heidegger's Befindhlichkeit.. Befindlichkeit is not the product of
an orienting device, adaptation or conditioning scheme, and not the ground of any reciprocally
causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived abstraction
concealing its own basis in temporality.
In order to understand primordial situatedness, we have to bracket Ratcliffe's causal naturalist
model in its entirety, and think prior to the split between feeling and thinking that it presupposes
What is essential and invariant in the Heideggerian structure of situatedness as temporality is that
each moment is the disclosure of the now as affectingly foreign-familiar. For Heidegger not only
is there no self and no world prior to relationship, but the self is nothing BUT this between.
Being situated in a world is not a contingent accomplishment of a scheme of reinforcements, but
a presupposition of Being.
Heidegger offers:
"We can see once more that attunements never emerge in the empty space of the soul and then
disappear again; rather, Dasein as Dasein is always already attuned in its very grounds. There is
only ever a change of attunement. We stated in a provisional and rough and ready manner that
attunements are the 'presupposition' for, and 'medium' of thinking and acting. That means as
much as to say that they reach more primordially back into our essence, that in them we first
meet ourselves-as being-there, as a Da-sein." (Heidegger 1995, p.68)
Dasein is always fundamentally affectively situated in that it is thrown into its NOW as surprised
familiarity. This means that attunement is not a relationship between self and world that can be
broken or diminished, as Ratcliffe asserts, regardless of what mood one is in. The most
intractably severe depression is still, moment to moment, an awareness of being thrown into
continual affective transformation and transition, as long as it is an awareness of anything at all.
And as self-transforming, the affective basis of ongoing experience is always at the same time a
projecting fore-having that anticipates into what surprises or disappoints or depresses it. The
world of the depressive that appears unreal, insignificant, irrelevant, un-engaging, is meaningful
precisely in its unreality and deficiency as disorienting, confusing, strange, uncanny,
un-engageable, numbing. Experience of ongoing deprivation, lack and loss is not the
degeneration of the structure of situatedness as projective-thrownness, but situatedness as always
a new but at the same time anticipated sense of loss and absence.
Heidegger tells us:
"Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with" "Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even
when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is
being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a
deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter." When one feels alone in a
crowd, "Their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking
and "being away" are modes of Mitda-sein...[Being-with-others]". (Being and Time, p.113)
I want to make clear that the essential issue between Heidegger and Ratcliffe I am attempting to
articulate does not rest on whether we deem the nightmarish existential experience of severe
depression, as well as other alterations of affective significance, in qualitative vs quantitative
terms. After all, Heidegger uses a variety of adjectives (distorted, flattened, blind to itself, led
astray, confused, closed off, obscuring, forgetful, deficient) to describe inauthentic modes of
Dasein, and their associated moods, which can just as well be interpreted in terms of a lessening
of the fluidity of existential movement as they can via a positive qualitative shift in modality of
comportment.
The key point here is that however we prefer to characterize the organizational characteristics of
mood marking the devastation of depression and other pathologies of world significance, we
must understand such variation as taking place within the structure of a primordial situatedness
whose essential features are invariant throughout such vicissitudes of mood. Specifically, what
remains essential regardless of the severity of states of trauma. melancholia or depersonalization,
is the underlying temporal-affective-intentional 'glue' of Befindlichkeit. To be radically,
irreducibly , primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed , at every moment, a world that
feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as foreign. And it is simultaneously, to feel a
belonging (familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to the anticipative,
projective futural aspect of temporality. In this way, affectivity as temporality constitutes the
essence of the fundamental, irreducibly situated felt significance and relevance a world always
already has for me, a meaningfulness within whose bounds pathological conditions such as
depression appear as modifications, but whose basis they can never undermine.(Heidegger would
say that their possibility as deficiencies or privations is proof for the essentiality of
Befindlichkeit.).
Such experiences are predicaments within affective situatedness rather than crises of
situatedness. The supposed crisis of situatedness which leads to what Ratcliffe calls an
impairment and even incompetence in capacity to experience significant meaningfulness
(Ratcliffe, forthcoming) only appears as a possibility when one begins from a split between affect
and intention. When one instead begins from the fusion of self and world that radical temporality
instantiates, there can be only existential predicaments, not disorders of situatedness. Since I am
always already relevantly involved in a world via thrownness, depression has to do with the kind
of relevance I experience, not my capacity or competence to experience it . And contra Ratcliffe,
anxiety doesn't 'cause' alienation, it is the attempt to mitigate the loss of coherence that
alienating, threatening events portend. Heidegger says anxiety is a form of fear, and "fear is a fear
of something threatening-of something that is detrimental to the factical potentiality-of-being of
Da-sein" "What is encountered has the relevant nature of harmfulness." (Being and Time p.313).
Thus it is the situation, not the emotion, that is alienating, and anxious attunement is the
anticipation of, and incipient comportment away from, an impeding event that holds within itself
the specter of the alien, the unassimilable and thus the unanticipatable.
In order for Ratcliffe to be convinced that attunement and understanding are truly
equi-primordial, he would have to find a way to relate the affective and cognitive aspects of
experience more intricately than he has been able to. For Heidegger, mood and understanding are
equi-primordial because the objective and subjective poles of experience are inseparable in each
moment of experience. That is to say, Heideigger's notion of temporality makes movement,
becoming, transition, the in-between, prior to any beings, bodies, states, entities, schemes that
supposedly exist for a moment as in-themselves entities and then undergo change. The
in-between IS affect and feeling itself, as well as sense, as the being affected by what one
projectively discloses ahead of oneself (reminiscent of Husserl's inseparable objective-subjective
contributions to feeling). For Heidegger, affect, emotion and feeling are not bodily structures
reporting, interpreting or reacting to change, they are change itself as the structure of temporality.
Heidegger captures this in-between with his notion of authentic anxiety, the essence of being
changed by what is disclosed , abstracted from all contingent features of world context. Authentic
anxiety , not as selective scheme of bodily reinforcement, but as temporality in its essence,
underlies all and is implied by all particular moods, since every moment of time is both of
familiarity (forehaving) and surprise (thrownness), relation and foreignness.
"Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in
everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein,
not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically
as the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything
unfamiliar" "Even as covered over, the familiar is a mode of the unfamiliar."(Heidegger 2010)
The inseparable co-dependence of the foreign and the familiar (the essence of affectivity as well
as sense) is implicit in the radical temporal understanding common to the phenomenologies of
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Gendlin. With his concept of primordial anxiety,
Heidegger's intention is not to give preference to alienation and disconnection over relational
integrity. He is re-situating the identity-difference , same -other, subject -object, affect-intentional
binary (which appears for Ratciffe in the guise of reciprocal objective causality) in a more
primordial way. The fact that the foreign-familiar binary of primordial anxiety underlies all
particular attunements of situatedness doesn't deprive Heidegger's model of the relative ongoing
meaningful stability over time that is rendered in Ratcliffe's perspective. Rather, it grounds
Ratcliffe's structures within a more intricate dynamic. Even the most confident, effectively
anticipatory and harmonious schematic comportment toward the world pre-supposes
Heideggerian 'anxiety', the projective-surprised being-affected by the world in general, in each
moment of its instantiation.
The paradox of Heidegger's radically temporal thinking is that it enacts a carrying-forward which
re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending
the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. Heideggerian attunement exposes a relentless
global self and world-transformational mobility within every moment of, but invisible to,
Ratcliffe's supposed schematic existential states, and at the same time imparts to our ongoing
world situatedness an irreducible integrity and intimacy which no pathology can undermine.
Gendlin's Model of Temporality and Implicit Intricacy:
My attempt at a direct comparison between Ratcliffe's naturalized, embodied approach and
Heidegger's ontological project has been somewhat hampered by the fact that Heidegger made
little reference in his work to the status and role of the body in relation to situatedness and
affectivity. It may be helpful , then , to turn to Eugene Gendlin's process model. Like Ratcliffe's
existential feeling, Gendlin's approach offers a naturalized account of embodied affect. But
Gendlin rejects Ratcliffe's causal conditioning model, and its reliance on conventional notions of
time, in favor of a reading of Heideggerian temporality consonant with the one I have been
advancing in this paper. In various writings, he distinguishes his Heideggerian account of
affective situatedness from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as
those of Gallagher , Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012).
Gendlin's approach has elements that seem to fall within the causal adaptationist orbit
characterizing Ratcliffe's approach. Like Ratcliffe, Gendlin sees emotion as an evolutionary
adaptation that specifically organizes behavior by selectively altering attention. But Gendlin
differentiates emotion form bodily feeling, what he calls felt sensing. Here we have an
articulation of bodily feeling as an organized totality whose motivational principle is not that of
an interactional casusality between feeling and knowing states, but an implicitly feeling-knowing
sense.
Gendlin's account superficially resembles Ratcliffe's embodied cognitive approach in its rejection
of symbolic representationalism and decoupleability, but there are crucial differences. In
Ratcliffe's model, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point,
whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning
organization somehow "knows about", belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part.
And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself(even if just for an instant).
What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could
justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization
precedes the existence of individual entities?
As Gendlin(1997b) argues,
'The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a
continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to
what is next to it..."(p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does not simply sit
alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past [Gendlin characterizes this past as an
implicatory whole]. "In the old model something (say a particle or a body) exists, defined as
filling space and time. Then it also goes through some process. Or it does not. It is defined as "it"
regardless of the process "it" goes through. "It" is separate from a system of changes and
relationships that are "possible" for "it."(p.50)...'In the old model one assumes that there must
first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it...In the process we are
looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its
effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How
can "it" be already affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in
turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a
division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference
made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect
"it."(p.40)
Speaking to Ratcliffe's causal interaffecting organizational model of existential feeling, Gendlin
explains:
If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as
one finds them, as if unexpectedly..."Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the
old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also
related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we
have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they"
inter-affect each other before they are a they(p.22).
Gendlin's organizational principle of radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian
approach to temporality, exposes the concept of states , dispositions, and causal interactions
between felt and intentional factors founding Ratcliffe's model as an abstraction derived from a
more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger's
attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the
other. On the one hand, cognition, often conceived as propositional intentionality, is not simply
directedness toward or an aiming at an object, or being about something. It is a transformation
and enrichment of a prior meaning context, a creative alteration of sense. (Ratcliffe claims bodily
feeling and intentional state are two sides of the same coin, but nevertheless he still separates
them . For instance: "some instances of diagnosed depression will most likely conform to
cognitive approaches, that they will involve systems of intentional states rather than existential
feelings." )
"Supposedly cognizing the "external" things does not change them. Cognizing is only about
them. This "only about" assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the
situation including what our scientific work is about. But I will argue that it does change the
behavior space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. "Only about" has meant
that cognition happens in representations." (Gendlin 2008)
On the other hand, bodily feeling is already a cognate sensing."Currently it still clashes with our
habits of language to say "we think with the body." Gendlin doesn't need to employ a notion of
feeling as selective hedonic reinforcement of intentional organization, since it is temporality that
organizes implicit bodily meaning. Feeling, as meaningful "sensed complexity", "implicit
understanding sensed in living", makes reference to implicit bodily organizational process and by
doing so contributes to the process as a further change within it. "To feel something as an inner
object is a change.., not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it."(Emotions
in Therapy)
"We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior
context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further
implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings
of this kind."(2008)
"Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a
different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time
positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process
Model, IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of "future" and a kind of
"past" that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the liner model by
considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying. "
Gendlin's understanding of the body as sense creating via radical temporal organization locates
his proximity not only to Heidegger and Husserl, but to Merleau-Ponty.
As Roald, Levin, and KÃ ppe 2018 explain in their Merleau-Pontian challenge to bodily theories
of emotion:
"The body is inherently involved in the production of meaning, and subjectivity is constituted
intersubjectively or dialectically; thus there is always an element of alterity and familiarity in
experience. [The body] forms and informs consciousness and produces not just the constraint
conditions for consciousness, that is, sets limits for what it can be, but takes part in creating its
form." Affective Incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Challenge to Bodily Theories of
Emotion (Roald, T., Levin, K., & KÃ ppe, S. (2018))
Merleau-Ponty defines an emotion as " a variation in our relations with others and the world
which is expressed in our bodily attitude" (1964b, p. 53)."
Ratcliffe interprets this to mean that emotion is a change in one's habitual mode of existential
feeling. "This points to a distinction between an emotional disturbance and a more mundane
experience of something as significant relative to some project or set of projects. "(Ratcliffe
2019) However, for Merleau-Ponty, there is no pre-intentional disposition orienting experience,
because being disposed or oriented ( as figure-ground structure of a gestalt field) only exists in
intention, as variation. Perception, as the ground of experience, only has being as
self-transforming action. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, as for Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger,
temporality is the driving force of affectivity and intentionality.
" In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or
polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception
of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and
the world." (Phenomenology of Perception, p.499). "Action is, by definition, the violent
transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I am to what I intend to be.", "When
I say that I know and like someone, I aim, beyond his qualities, at an inexhaustible ground which
may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is the price for there being things
and 'other people' for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as the result of a violent act which
is perception itself. " (Phenomenology of Perception, p.444)).
Merleau-Ponty equates intention with attention:
"Attention is "a change of the structure of consciousness, the establishment of a new dimension
of experience, the setting forth of an a priori... To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate
pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. "(p.35)
"The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena
which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they
destroy it. Thus attention is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought
already in control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit
and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon."(p.35)
Conclusion:
I have argued in this paper that affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe as
globally patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling), functions as a structure of
entrenchment and self-conservation, inhering in itself and resisting its own transformation. A
global change in bodily feeling is thus required to infuse supposedly stagnant
affective-intentional narratives with a new direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns,
dissolve the conditioning glue holding them together, reveal their contingency and open up new
possibilities. Ratcliffe sees the role of Husserl's transcendental reduction and Heidegger's
primordial anxiety as such disrupters. I have claimed, instead, that rather than a contingent island
of static structure in a sea of indeterminacy, an affective - intentional attunement is the essence of
temporal becoming as self-transformative dynamic, hiding within the supposedly static moment
of Ratcliffe's existential feeling state. The role of the epoche and authentic anxiety is to reveal
this intimate, intricate foreign-familiar binary of movement concealed within naive naturalized
models of psychological functioning. If the purpose of the epoche and primordial anxiety is, as
Ratcliffe says, to bring us face to face with indeterminacy, then it is not an indeterminacy outside
of, before, after, or surrounding stable structures of situatedness, but rather an indeterminacy at
the core of those structures themselves. But Befindlichkeit at the same time evinces a radical
self-belonging and irreducible world-connectedness obscured by and undiscoverable when
thought in terms of Ratcliffe's schematisms.
In failing to ground affective experience in radical temporality , Ratcliffe's conception of mood as
causally configured state renders his approach an outsider's view. By the time Ratcliffe has
noticed what he calls a shift in mood, an intricate process of change of felt meaning has already
taken place, both within thematically harmonious and confused temporally unfolding episodes of
affective experience. Not recognizing this fundamental co-dependence between transitivity and
identity leads to reification of each pole of experience. If dispositions to act and acts themselves,
being and becoming, feeling and intention, can be treated as separate moments, then their
relations are rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring causations and glues to piece them
together.
Ratcliffe writes: "This default 'style' (minimal self) of anticipation is not specific to any particular
life-structure, any particular configuration of cares, concerns, commitments, projects, and
pastimes. It is, if you like, the glue needed to hold any such structure together, any kind of
world."(Trauma, Language and Trust, forthcoming)
The glue that holds together Ratcliffe's minimal self, interaffecting causation, is a secondary
concept of organization, a naturalized abstraction derived from the primary termporal
structuration of affectivity-connation-intention.
What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher's primary intersubjectity account , writes in that narrower
context, could apply to Ratcliffe's general orientation,; " first we carve nature up at artificial
joints - we split mind and body apart - and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task
for which the notion of embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone's assessment, used as a
kind of glue . But glueing the two back together does not bring back the original ''integrity and
nature of the whole" (De Jaegher 2009, Sheets-Johnstone ,in press). Unlike first generation
cognitivims, Ratcliffe begins from interaction, but an interaction that is grounded in separated
moments of subject and object, feeling and intention, being and becoming, time and stasis.
The radically temporal account of affect introduced by Husserl and transformed in different ways
by Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions
supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:
1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction,
by extrinsic reinforcement contingencies. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically
affective (qualitatively self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive,
'rational', reflective type of awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral
empirical accounts, qualitatively, intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it
references. Feelings belong to, operate within, carry forward, and transform what are called
conceptual meanings . This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to moment experience
is often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical stability and
inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly self-perpetuating
coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing pre-reflective
self-awareness, minimal self or reflexive 'feeling of being'.
2) 'Raw' affect is intrinsically intentional. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only manifest
the characteristics of metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated with
conceptual thought, but in fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been called
conceptual meaning in any stable way.
Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, within and beyond such
terms as cognitive states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of self-exceeding senses,
modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but
modulations of modulations.
If feeling, understood this new way, IS the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual
thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the subjective
and the objective, the felt and the understood, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial
independence of rationality and affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects
inherent in each event. The inter-affecting of context and novelty which defines an event
simultaneously produces a fresh, particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique
momentum (hedonic component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valuative,
hedonic (the perceived goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying
'non-emotional' appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply IS our vicissitudes of
momentum of sense-making through situations, rather than arising from causal feedback loops.
Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations
and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how intimately and harmoniously we
are able to anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move
through, new experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum,
ranging from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense
transformative movement, is intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute
the origin of aesthetic pleasures and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like
bodily affects, even if it is understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long
in psychology .
From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often
appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or
accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence.
When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively
enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately
disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species
apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal,
energy) invading, conditioning and orienting perceptual and conceptual thought from without as
a background field. It is said that such 'raw' or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological,
pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we
are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and
gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations
have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, propositional, rational,
logical, theoretical, non-aesthetic. However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus
reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not
effectively understood as reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions
and body states; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually unfolding process
which is always, at the same time, within the same event, intentional and affective.
Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a 'cognitive' appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation,
movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily
sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes (even when treated as mutually
structuring each other via 'intentional-affective' syntheses) which I am questioning. The point
isn't that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous
system and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of
emotion, feeling and mood, but that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called
conceptual appraisal or bodily sensation, the phenomenological scene of affect (or any other
aspect of bio-psycho-social functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual
conditioning between discrete components. Prinz(2004), Colombetti and Thompson(2006),
Damasio(1999) and others deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the
feeling of emotion is affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of
connection with the body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what
are called cognitive and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I
want to turn their views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a
spatial locale and repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body,
as a separate locale with semi-independent contents.
I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect
is intentional. But if both the former and latter are true , it is not because body sensation
structures cognition(or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but
inadequately formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the
intentional prior to any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could
speak of the occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a
background field of physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to
re-figure all of these modes, what would be referred to as the "motoric", the "sensate", the
"cognitive", as unstable metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the
course of an indissociably intentive-affective global movement of experience which would imply
the unraveling of the basis of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding of
these terms.
When I am frightened, whether I focus on my attitude toward the world, my rapid heartbeat, my
facial expression or bodily preparation for action, each of these aspects emerge out of each other
as a fully reflective, metaphoric carrying forward and further transforming of the deepening
implications of this tentative, confused situation. All these aspects already belong to, and in fact
have their meaning ENTIRELY defined as variations-continuations of the thematic unfolding of
my sense of the emerging threat, subtly remaking my entire past while always maintaining a
sense, no matter how surprising, unpredictable or disturbing a new present appears, of
implicatory belonging to this prior history.
Intermingled with my wandering in and out of significant shifts in experiential momentum, from
doubts, terrors, and confusions to later confidences and contentments, will be more subtly
self-transforming moments whose continual intuitive shifts of meaning, purpose and affective
momentum are hidden so effectively that it may fool me into believing that this more plodding
progress of comprehension represents the appearance of a different species from that of
pronounced feeling, the realm of affectively neutral (or constant) cognitive states. However, such
entities as narrative schemes and conceptual forms may in fact have no actual status other than as
empty abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms,
immediately and unknowingly transform the hedonically felt senses operating within (and
defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways. Feeling, the event, the inter-bleeding of
subject and object, transformation without form: all of these terms reference the same irreducible
'unit' of experience, concealed by but overrunning what bodies, dispositions and other states are
supposed to do. A 'single' state (whether so-called conceptual or bodily-affective) is already a
panoply of intimately changing variations and momenta of felt meanings, in(as) the instant it is
accessed, infusing the allegedly conceptual with feeling (and the sensate with intentionality) from
within its very core, embodied before any consultation wit h a separate bodily 'outside'.
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INTRODUCTION:
Psychological theorizing today, in dialogue with the results of researches in phenomenological
and pragmatist philosophy and anthropology, points to an important re-envisioning of the role of
concepts such as inter-subjectivity, metaphor, the unconscious and emotion in the functioning of
a psychological organization. While today's diverse embodied approaches (Clark(1997),
Damasio(2000), Galagher(2005), Lakoff & Johnson(1999), Ratcliffe(2007), Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch(1991)) have made significant advances over the more traditional perspectives in
psychology which they target(1st generation cognitivism, symbolic computationalism), I suggest
that these newer perspectives have failed to depart sufficiently from older approaches in one
important respect.
Specifically, I will argue in this paper that the capacity of contemporary psychologies to depict a
meaning-making organization generating thoroughgoing affectation, interaction and novelty may
be hampered by their reliance on a notion of psycho-biological and interpersonal entities as
discrete states. Residing within each of the myriad temporary subagents and bits comprising a
psychological system is a supposed literal, albeit near-meaningless, identity. While the role of
identity in embodied approaches is less prominent than in classical cognitivist frameworks
(newer approaches replace the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a reciprocal
system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and
socially embedded), I allege that a failure of current approaches to banish the lingering notion of
a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may be
responsible for the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the
assumed frozen space of each part.
What could be the basis of my claim that the diverse assortment of embodied models offered by
researchers like Gallagher, Varela, Clark, Damasio and Johnson have in common the treatment
of the parts of a psychological organization as ossified centers resistant to novelty, considering
that the dynamical properties in many of these approaches specifically determine psychological
processes as non-representational and non-decoupleable "...variables changing continuously,
concurrently and interdependently over quantitative time..."(Van Gelder,1999,p.244)? And what
is a 'part' anyway?
Interaction Before Identity:
Let me begin by suggesting the following thought experiment: What if, rather than an element of
meaning (perceptual, conceptual, physiological) being juxtaposed or coinciding with what
preceded and conditioned it in the manner of contact between two distinct entities, we were to
imagine that the context of a prior event and the presencing of a new event indissociably
belonged to the same event? I do not have in mind a simple compacting together of past and
present as distinct and separable things, but a way of looking at the relation between a meaning
and its background which sees not just the interaction BETWEEN things but the things, entities,
parts, bodies THEMSELVES as already kinds of qualitative change, not states but passages, a
non-contradictory way of intending beyond what is intended. I want you to entertain the notion
that the primordial 'unit' of experience is not a form that is transformed by contact with another
entity, not a presence that is changed by a separate encounter with another presence, but an
experience already other, more than itself in the very moment of being itself, not a form, presence
or shining OCCUPYING space but already a self-exceeding, a transit, a being-otherwise. What I
am suggesting is that there are no such things as discrete entities.
The irreducible basis of experience is the EVENT (many events can unfold within the supposed
space of a single so-called entity). Events do not follow one another in time (or in parallel) as
hermetically sealed links of a chain. Each event does not only bear the mark of influence of
previous events, but carries them within it even as it transforms them. An event is a synthetic
unity, a dynamic structure devoid of simply identity. Writers endorsing a general account of
meaning as non-recuperable or non-coincidental from one instantiation to the next may
nonetheless treat the heterogeneous contacts between instants of experience as transformations of
fleeting forms, states, logics, structures, outlines, surfaces, presences, organizations, patterns,
procedures, frames, standpoints. When thought as pattern, the structural-transcendental moment
of eventness upholds a certain logic of internal relation; the elements of the configuration
mutually signify each other and the structure presents itself as a fleeting identity, a gathered field.
The particularity of eventness is not allowed to split the presumed (temporary) identity of the
internal configuration that defines the structure as structure. History would be the endless
reframing of a frame, the infinite shifting from paradigm to paradigm.
It is this presumed schematic internality of eventness, the power of abstractive multiplicity given
to the sign, which causes experience to be treated as resistant to its dislocation, as a lingering or
resistant form, pattern, configuration, infrastructure. Of the numerous philosophers since Hegel
who have attempted to resuce the subject-object scheme-content relation from metaphysical
domination (Kierkegaard, Gadmaer, Levinas, Nietzsche), Heidegger and Derrida are among the
first to question and dismantle the very possibility of structure-pattern-scheme as subject or
object. How so?
Let us examine the phenomenon of structure more closely. How is structure composed? What is
the structurality of structure? Contemporary philosophical thinking outside of Heidegger and
Derrida tends to think the spatial frame of structure as enclosure of co-present elements. It is an
internality, full presence, a resting in itself and an auto-affection. Structure would be a pattern
framing a finite array of elements . It would be a system of classification, a vector or center of
organization. We can think pattern in abstract(the structure of democracy) or concrete( the
structure of a house) terms. A structure has properties in the minimal sense that it is defined by
its center, that which organizes and, determines it thematically as that which is the bearer of its
attributes, that according to which its elements are aligned. Structure is plurality of the identical.
If a structure is an organization of elements, those elements themselves are structures. The object
is structure in that it is self-presence, its turning back to itself in order to be itself as presence,
subsistence, auto-affection, the 'this as itself'. Therefore structure would be irreducible. It would
be the primordial basis of beings as objects (point of presence, fixed origin) as internality, space
as frame, subsistence, pure auto-affection, representation , category, law, self-presence itself.
Also value, will, norm. So much rides on where we begin from in thinking about beginnings.
In various writings Derrida deconstructs the notion of structure. He argues that structure implies
center, and at the center, transformation of elements is forbidden. But he says in fact there is no
center, just the desire for center. If there is no center, there is no such singular thing as structure,
only the decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. "Henceforth, it was necessary to
begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a
present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a
sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a
center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say,
a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never
absolutely present outside a system of differences."(Sign, Structure and Play, Writing and
Difference p352)
"The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account
that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other
elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is
differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits
each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the
remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential
structure escaping the logic of presence..(Limited Inc p53)."
In their essence, Beings don't HAVE structure or constitution. There is no such THING as a
form, a structure, a state. There is no trans-formation but rather a trans-differentiation,
(transformation without form, articulation as dislocation) What is being transcended is not form
but difference. Each of the elements in the array that define a structure are differences .They do
not belong to a structure . They are their own differentiation. There is no gathering, cobbling ,
synthesis, relating together, only a repetition of differentiation such that what would have been
called a form or structure is a being the same differently from one to the next. Not a simultaneity
but a sequence. So one could not say that form of nature is the way in which nature transitions
through and places itself into the forms and states that, from a schematic perspective, constitute
the path of its movement, and nature turns into natural things, and vice versa. Nature would not
transition through forms and states, Nature, as difference itself, transitions though differential
transitions. Differences are not forms. Forms are enclosures of elements organized according to a
rule. Forms give direction. Difference does not give direction, it only changes direction. What are
commonly called forms are a temporally unfolding system of differences with no organizing rule,
no temporary 'it'. The transformation is from one differential to the next before one ever gets to a
form.
Schemes, conceptual, forms, intentions, willings have no actual status other than as empty
abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms,
immediately and unknowingly transform the senses operating within (and defining) such
abstractions in subtle but global ways concealed by but overrunning what symbols, bits,
assemblies, bodies, frames and other states are supposed to be. The briefest identification of a
so-called state is an unknowing experiencing of temporally unfolding multiplicity of differences.
In Being and Time, 'What is a Thing' and other writings, Heidegger describes a structure-thing as
the bearer of properties and underlies qualities. A thing is a nucleus around which many changing
qualities are grouped, or a bearer upon which the qualities rest, something that possesses
something in itself. It has an internal organization. But Heidegger doesn't settle for this present to
hand account. In a gesture allied with Derrida, he thinks the structurality of structure as the Being
of beings. But he doesn't do this by conceiving Being via the transitioning through and placing
itself into, the turning toward and away from, structures, forms, schemes. This would be to
pre-suppose the metaphysical concept of structure as present to hand state, and thus leave it
unquestioned. Heidegger locates transformation within structure, as Derrida does in his own way.
Heidegger's discussion of propositional statements in BT sec 33 is key here. In this section he
derives the apophantic 'as' structure of propositional logic from the hermeneutical 'as'.
As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of
propositional statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external
'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as
attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting
care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it
is taken together with it, but not in the manner of a synthesizing relating. Heidegger instead
describes the 'as' as a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the
same time takes apart what has been put together." Transcendence locates itself in this way
within the very heart of the theoretical concept. Simply determining something AS something is
a transforming-performing. It "understands, interprets, and articulates", and thereby "takes apart"
and changes what it affirms by merely pointing at it, by merely having it happen to 'BE' itself.
Heidegger's hermeneutical 'as' functions as Derrida's differential system of signs. Something is
something only as differential . Articulation of the 'is' transforms in order to articulate. That is,
articulation, hinge, IS the 'in order to'. Thus, the problem of the primordial grounding of the 'is',
and the analysis of the logos are the same problem.
Heidegger writes: "The "is" here speaks transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in
the manner of a transition to beings. But Being does not leave its own place and go over to
beings, as though beings were first without Being and could be approached by Being
subsequently. Being transits (that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something
of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over." "That differentiation alone grants and holds
apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another, are
borne away from and toward each other."(Identity and Difference.p.64)
This is the method of Heidegger's decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. The
thinking of structure as a singularity implies a multiplicity of supposed 'parts' captured in an
instant of time. But the assumption that we think this parallel existence of differences at the
'same time', as the 'same space', organized and centered as a 'THIS', must unravel with the
knowledge that each differential singular is born of and belongs irreducibly to, even as it is a
transformation of, an immediately prior element . Two different elements cannot be presumed to
exist at the same time because each single element is its own time(the hinged time of the pairing
of a passed event with the presencing of a new event) as a change of place. Thus, whenever we
think that we are theorizing two events at the same time, we are unknowingly engaging in a
process of temporal enchainment and spatial re-contextualization. The assumption of a spatial
frame depends on the ability to return to a previous element without the contaminating effect of
time. How can we know that elements of meaning are of the same spatial frame unless each is
assumed to refer back to the same 'pre-existing' structure? The same goes for the fixing of a point
of presence as a singular object. This pointing to, and fixing of, an itself as itself is a thematic
centering that brings with it all the metaphysical implications of the thinking of a structural
center. Heidegger's 'as'(which is not a structure in itself but a differential) explains, derives and
deconstructs form, structure, thing before it can ever establish itself as a 'this'.
The issue here centers on the understanding of the phenomenological experience of time, the
philosophical discussion of which has been ongoing since Aristotle. This conversation has
recently been joined by a number of psychologists (See Gallagher(1998) , Van Gelder(1996) and
Varela(1999b)), who support the idea of the nowness of the present as differentiated within itself.
They recognize that the present is not properly understood as an isolated 'now' point; it involves
not just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don't hear
sequences of notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an
unfolding context. As James(1978) wrote:"...earlier and later are present to each other in an
experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together" ( p.77).
The key question is how this 'both together' is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a
bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself,
the function of a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities? Or does
my dynamic 'now' consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange coupling of a past
and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no
longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? I contend that, even taking into account
a significant diversity of views within the contemporary scene concerning the nature of
time-consciousness, including critiques of James' perspective, current psychologies conceive the
'both-together' of the pairing of past and present as a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or
aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which
supplements that past. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that
they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.
(FOOTNOTE:I support Husserl's depiction of experience as an indeterminate intersubjective
movement of temporality. However, I agree with the argument, made in different ways by
commentators such as such as Gallagher(1998), Derrida(1973), Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger,
that Husserl's retentional-protentional model of time-consciousnesss slighted the genetic and
historical in favor of a transparent present and a historicist time.)
For instance, Zahavi(1999), following Husserl, views the internally differentiated structure of
'now' awareness as consisting of a retentional, primal impressional, and protentional phase.
While he denies that these phases are "different and separate elements"(p.90), claiming them
instead as an immediately given, ecstatic unity, their status as opposing identities is suggested by
his depiction of the association between past and present as a fracturing, "... namely, the fracture
between Self and Other, between immanence and transcendence"(p.134).
This Husserlian thematic, rendering past and present as an indissociable-but-fractured interaction
between subject and object, inside and outside, reappears within a varied host of naturalized
psychological approaches that link self-affection to an embodied neural organization of
reciprocally causal relations among non-decoupleable parts or subprocesses. While these
components interact constantly (Varela(1996b) says "...in brain and behavior there is never a
stopping or dwelling cognitive state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient
[stabilities] underlying a momentary act"(p.291) , it doesn't seem as if one could go so far as to
claim that the very SENSE of each participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and
immediately dependent on the meanings of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to
claim that each affects and is affected by the others as a temporary homunculus (little man) or
self perceives an object. Varela(1999a) offers "...lots of simple agents having simple properties
may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as
a purposeful and integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these agents may be said
to PRECEDE its interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies and inheres in its own
state, presenting its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart from, even as it is
considered conjoined to, the context which conditions it and the future which is conditioned by
it.
Perhaps I am misreading Varela and other enactivist proponents . Am I saying that these
contemporary accounts necessarily disagree with Merleau-Ponty's(1968) critique of the idea of
the object-in-itself?
...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself,
that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are
already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at
the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which
experience ignores(p.162).
On the contrary, as different as Merleau-Ponty's and various enactivist accounts may be in other
respects, it seems to me that they share a rejection of the idea of a constituted subjectivity
encountering and representing an independent in-itself. Mark C. Taylor(2001) characterizes the
enactivist ethos thusly; "Contrary to popular opinion and many philosophical epistemologies,
knowledge does not involve the union or synthesis of an already existing subject and an
independent object"( p.208). In a very general sense, what is articulated by Varela, Gallagher and
others as the reciprocal, nondecoupleable interconnections within a dynamical system functions
for Merleau-Ponty as the 'flesh' of the world; the site of reciprocal intertwining between an In
Itself and a For Itself, subject and object, consciousness and the pre-noetic, activity and passivity,
the sensible and the sentient, the touching and the touched. My point is that current accounts may
also have in common with Merleau-Ponty the belief that subjective context and objective sense
reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication (Merleau-Ponty
calls it an abyss, thickness or chiasm) between discrete contents. "...that difference without
contradiction, that divergence between the within and without ... is not an obstacle between them,
it is their means of communication(Merleau-Ponty 1968 ,p.135)."
By contrast, I assert that the 'now' structure of an event is not an intertwining relation between
contingent, non-decoupleable identities, states, phases, but an odd kind of intersecting
implicating perhaps a new understanding of intentionality; intentional object and background
context are not adjacent regions(a within and a without) in space or time; they have already been
contaminated by each other such that they are inseparably co-implied as a single edge (Try to
imagine separating the 'parts' of an edge. Attempting to do so only conjures a new edge). Time
itself must be seen in this way as immediately both real and ideal. Events don't speak with their
surrounds. They ARE their surrounds; the current context of an event is not a system of relations
but an indivisible gesture of passage.
(FOOTNOTE: This gesture cannot be reduced to either a subjective mechanism of consciousness
or to objective relations between particles. Like the idea of the inter-penetration of fact and value
informing phenomenological philosophical perspectives, this is a
quasi-transcendental(simultaneously subjective and empirical) claim concerning the irreducible
nature of reality and time itself, and operates both as a pre-condition and a re-envisioning of
subjective consciousness and empirical bodies.)
Gendlin(1997b), in his groundbreaking book 'A Process Model', offers an account of the nature
of psychological organization which I consider in many respects closely compatible with my
own. He explains:
In the old model something (say a particle or a body) exists, defined as filling space and time.
Then it also goes through some process. Or it does not. It is defined as "it" regardless of the
process "it" goes through. "It" is separate from a system of changes and relationships that are
"possible" for "it."(p.50)...'In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit,
separate from how its effects in turn affect it...In the process we are looking at there is no
separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what
happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already
affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With
the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and
its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model
it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it."(p.40)
If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as
one finds them, as if unexpectedly..."Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the
old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also
related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we
have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they"
inter-affect each other before they are a they(p.22).
Gendlin's account somewhat resembles embodied cognitive and dynamical systems approaches
in its rejection of symbolic representationalism and decoupleability, but I believe there are crucial
differences. For instance, in current models, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion
from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part
of a meaning organization somehow "knows about", belongs to and depends intrinsically on each
other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself(even if just for an
instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation
could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological
organization precedes the existence of individual entities? Allow me to creatively interweave
Gendlin's text with my own, and suggest that an 'entity' can never be understood as
OCCUPYING a present state, even for a moment. Its very identity is differential not simply
because its relevance is defined by its relation to its context (embodied cognitive notions of the
subject-object relation), but because the essence of the event IS this intersection. What is other
than, more than an event (its just-past) is built into its own center in such a way that the relation
between events is never an arbitrary conditioning the way it seems to be allowed to be in current
accounts( as I will discuss in more detail later). That is why an event is better conceived as a
transit than a state.
The most important implication of this way of thinking about the organization of meaning and
intention is that the interaction between events can be seen as maintaining a radical continuity
and mutual dependency of implication. To say that an event exceeds itself , in the same moment
and the same space, as both past and present, is not simply to think the now as immediately a
differential between the new and a prior context. It is to envision a new event and the context out
of which it arises as BELONGING to, PART OF each other's senses in a radical way, rather than
just as externally cobbled together spatially or temporally as a mutual grafting, mapping,
mirroring, conditioning between little bodies. This duality within the event is not to be
understood as a fracture, opposition or chiasm between an already composed past carried over
from previous experience, and an arbitrary element of novelty related to this past across a divide
of thickness.
As Gendlin(1997b) argues, 'The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each
other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other
continuity to relate it to what is next to it..."(p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does
not simply sit alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past ( Gendlin characterizes
this past as an an implicatory whole):
...explication is not a representation of what "was" implicit; rather explication carries the
implying with it and carries it forward. An explication does not replace what it explicates. If one
divided them, one could try to divide between what is new and what is from before. Then one
part of the explication would be representational, and the other part would be arbitrary. An
occurring that carries forward is an explicating. It is neither the same nor just different. What is
the same cannot be divided from what is different (p.71).
What does it mean to say that what is the same can't be divided from what is different? I would
like to suggest that the very being of an event of meaning already is composed partly of that
which it is not, that which it is no longer. The role which this 'no-longer' plays isn't just as a
duplication of 'what it was' . It is a fresh, never before experienced version of my past which
forms part of the essence of a new event for me. What do I mean by this? Not only does a fresh
event belong to, carry forward, imply the immediate context which it transforms, but this
inter-contamination between past and present operates at the same time in the opposite direction.
The carried-forward past which, as I have said, inseparably belongs to a new event, is already
affected by this fresh present. What does this imply? Gendlin(1997b) explains, "When the past
functions to "interpret" the present, the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put
even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions
in"(p.37 ).
It is not as if other accounts do not recognize the transformative character of recollection. It
would be pointed out by any psychologist who had digested Merleau-Ponty's lessons concerning
reflection that the attempt to return repeatedly to an object of attention in order to preserve its
identity hopelessly contaminates the purity of that identity with the sediments of new context.
(FOOTNOTE:Mark C. Taylor writes:"Neither complete nor finished, the past is repeatedly recast
by a future that can never be anticipated in a present that cannot be fixed. Anticipation re-figures
recollection as much as recollection shapes expectation."(The Moment of
Complexity,2001,p.198)).
My claim is not, however, that the past is partially or eventually affected by the present, but that
its modification is globally and immediately implied by present experience. The past is
inseparable from the future which is framed by it. Because all meanings are referential, they don't
appear out of thin air but from a prior context. On the other hand, the past in its entirety is at the
same time implied and transformed in present context. There is no past available to us to retrieve
as an archive of presumably temporarily or partially preserved events of meaning. As we will see,
this view may run counter to current approaches according to which habitual pre-noetic bodily,
linguistic and cultural schemas are presumed to shape experiential processes("...the body in its
habitual schemas retains a [pre-noetic] past....that helps to define the
present"(Gallagher,1997,p.144)), and thus to constrain and structure the experience of novelty,
without themselves being immediately and globally refashioned in accord with the self-changing
direction of intentional movement.
The Literal is Metaphoric:
To this point it may strike readers that the argument being made amounts to a quibble. Even if it
were to be accepted as correct, what of theoretical and practical advantage is gained over
dynamical, embodied approaches by reworking the relationship between an element and its
context in the way I am suggesting? How does this amount to more than a shuffling around of
dimensional concepts? It is important to understand that it is not just dimensional slots that are
being questioned here but the central characteristics of what are considered entities (conceptual,
bodily, interpersonal), their alleged power to arbitrarily and polarizingly condition each other as
well as, paradoxically, to resist the advent of novelty. To criticize a system in continuous
inter-relational motion for resisting novelty, merely because it is depicted as interactions among
innumerable, dumb bits which may only exist for an instant of time, may seem to be a spurious
accusation to make. But as I hope to show, this seemingly insignificant property of stasis built
into these dumb bits of a dynamical, embodied and embedded ecological system expresses itself
at a macro level as homunculi-like schemes, assemblies and narratives (sensory-motor, emotive,
perceptual, conceptual and interpersonal) whose creative interplay and thematic consistency may
be restricted by the presumption of a distinction between their existence and
interaction.(Varela(1991) describes these bits as "...a whole army of neurallike, simple,
unintelligent components, which, when appropriately connected, have interesting global
properties. These global properties embody and express the cognitive capacities being sought"
(p.87).
A prime example of what I mean when I allege that a separation between the existence and
interaction of components of such systems polarizes their functioning can be found in the way
that current embodied approaches attempt to explain the mechanism of conceptual metaphor. For
instance, Lakoff and Johnson(1999) , in their effort to overturn the older view of metaphor as a
secondary and inferior linguistic form in comparison with literal meaning, depict metaphor as a
rich and indispensable component of abstract conceptualization.
FOOTNOTE:For related models, see Glucksberg and Keysar's(1990) attributive categorization
approach, Gentner's(Gentner, D., Bowdle, B., Wolff, P., & Boronat, C. (2001)) structure
mapping model, and Lakoff' and Johnson's(1980) conceptual metaphor theory.
Briefly , a metaphor is a correlation between conceptual domains, projecting patterns from the
source domain onto the target domain. Neurologically, metaphor originates in a conflation
between domains, a simultaneous activation of neural schemes in both the source and target.
Johnson insists that metaphors are not formal structures, but embodied and situational. The
cognitive domains, or "frames," out of which metaphors are formed "are not fixed structures or
images, but rather dynamic patterns of our interactions within various evolving environments"
(Johnson,1997, p.156). Even if frames are not permanently fixed schemes, they do have the
ability to conserve their structure over time. It is this conservative power that allows frames to
define, contain, mirror, map onto, apply to and correlate with particular new experiences.
"Conceptual metaphorical mappings appear to preserve image-schematic structure, and , in so
doing, they map spatial inference patterns onto abstract inference patterns"(p.156). Lakoff and
Johnson(1999) explain:
Abstract concepts have two parts:1) an inherent, literal, non-metaphorical skeleton, which is
simply not rich enough to serve as a full-fledged concept; and 2) a collection of stable,
conventional metaphorical extensions that flesh out the conceptual skeleton in a variety of ways
(often inconsistently with one another)(p.128). In general, central senses of words are arbitrary;
non-central senses are motivated but rarely predictable. Since there are many more non-central
senses than central senses of words, there is more motivation in a language than
arbitrariness(p.465).
While Lakoff-Johnson believe everyday thought is largely metaphorical, they don't accept that all
meanings are metaphorical ("...all basic sensorimotor concepts are literal"(p.58)). We can extract
the following points from Lakoff-Johnson's model:
1)Metaphors are not discrete concepts themselves but correlations between two pre-existing
conceptual domains.
2)Metaphors preserve the structure of the source domains that they borrow from.
3) Metaphors enrich a concept's non-central senses with motivated meaning, but a concept's
central senses are arbitrary.
4)Not all concepts are metaphorical.
We can trace the logic of these points back to the belief, maintained in different ways across a
diversity of psychological perspectives, that a concept has an 'inherent, literal, non-metaphorical
skeleton'. As Lakoff and Johnson affirm, an entity which inheres as its own state is arbitrary at its
core, and can relate to another meaning only in a separate move. Metaphor considered in this way
is not an intrinsic property of concepts, but a secondary function that may or may not apply to a
particular concept. And when it does apply, metaphor doesn't so much transcend the semantic
gap between concepts as co-opt it by grafting meaning comparisons and mirrorings onto
originally arbitrary, pre-existing conceptual cores.
To re-think the notion of an intrinsic conceptual state as the differential structure of transit I have
delineated in this paper is to change and enlarge the role of metaphor(and to re-define
intentionality) in important ways. I have argued that an event(whether conceived as conceptual or
bodily-physiological) is itself, at one time and in one gesture, the interbleeding between a prior
context(source) and novel content(target). Gendlin(1995) says, in such a crossing of source and
target, "each functions as already cross-affected by the other. Each is determined by, and also
determines the other(p.555)". Thus, the weak and ambivalent integrative function accomplished
by Lakoff and Johnson's model of metaphor as a correlation between conceptual domains may
conceal a more fundamental integration working WITHIN and BEYOND so-called concepts. By
this reckoning, all events are metaphorical in themselves, as a mutual inter-affecting of source
and target escaping the binary of representation and arbitrariness.
Gendlin(1997a) explains,
Contrary to a long history, I have argued that a metaphor does not consist of two situations, a
"source domain" and a "target domain". There is only one situation, the one in which the word is
now used. What the word brings from elsewhere is not a situation; rather it brings a use-family, a
great many situations. To understand an ordinary word, its use-family must cross with the present
situation. This crossing has been noticed only in odd uses which are called "metaphors"...all
word-use requires this metaphorical crossing(p.169).
Let's spell out the larger implications of this argument. All events of intentional meaning
in-themselves accomplish the powerful integrative function that has traditionally been attributed
to metaphoric relations between concepts, not by grafting or mapping one pre-existing state onto
another but by bringing the outside inside as the intimate self-transfiguration that is an event's
gesture.By contrast, current embodied psychologies appear to maintain an opposition between
inside and outside, subject and object, context and novelty, which not even the operation of
metaphor (or other narrative structures) can overcome. The integrative potential of
conceptual-linguistic consciousness is limited from the outset by the presumption of an
irreducibly arbitrary, literal core within entities. Of course, one could argue that, whether or not
Lakoff-Johnson's model explicitly indicates it, dynamical embodiment approaches imply that
there could be never such a thing as a 'strictly' literal meaning, since a conceptual element only
conveys meaning though non-decoupleable, differential relations with other elements in a process
with no permanent or transcendent center of origin. As Mark Taylor(2001) explains "Each
symbol within these networks is a node in a web of relations. Indeed, a symbol is nothing other
than the intersection of relations knotted in nodes"(p.211). In this sense a kind of
quasi-metaphoricity already obtains for so-called literal concepts. However, I have hypothesized
that for current approaches this relation between a concept and its wider context is conceived as a
conjoining of discrete contents, thereby preserving the primacy of a literal core at the heart of this
quasi-metaphorical intersecting.
Consciousness As Its Own Exceeding:
How might my claim concerning the intrinsic metaphoricity of intentional consciousness help to
shed new light on the wider realms of interactions within which intentionality is embedded,
encompassing such processes as the unconscious, bodily affectivities, and interpersonal
interactions? Not surprisingly, contemporary approaches seem to view these wider interactive
functions shaping intentionality in the same disjunctive terms that they apply to linguistic
processes . Gallagher(1998) writes:'There are many pre-noetic [outside of awareness] limitations
on intentionality: the effects of the unconscious, embodiment, language, historical traditions,
political and social structures, and so on"(p.160). He refers to these as "...happenings that go
beyond intentional experience and yet condition that very experience"(p.160). Descriptions from
blindsight(See footnote on blindsight), split-brain, perceptual priming, hypnosis and other
dissociative studies have been employed to lend support to this idea of a partial independence
among processes which are otherwise claimed to be thoroughly interactive.
As was the case with metaphor, what is at stake in all these examples is the question of whether
what is presumed to come at intentionality from an 'outside' in the form of semi-arbitrary
conditionings, (whether that outside is located as the quasi-metaphoric graftings between
conceptual states, the unconscious, the body, or the interpersonal world) is not better understood
as arising out of hitherto undiscovered resources concealed within so-called intention itself.
Rather than originating in an invasive, displacing outside, I suggest that psychological processes
seemingly unavailable to explicit consciousness are nevertheless implied by and belong to it (and
vice-versa), not in the sense of a content that arbitrarily contributes to awareness in the manner of
interactions between partially independent regions, but as an integral bodily background intrinsic
to, but not directly articulated in, each moment of awareness. In this view, the 'hidden hand' of
the unconscious, the body and culture conditions awareness not as a separate outside, but rather
exceeds conscious control from within each experienced event, as the hidden hand of integral
background context (intra-noetic rather than pre-noetic) See footnote on driving a car
.Gendlin(2000) puts it this way; "The puzzle about the body knowing our decisions before we
consciously know them might make us miss the fact that there is an inwardly experienced body,
and that the reflective and bodily-sentient person is much wider than conscious control"(p.110).
While it is easy to identify a present experience in terms of what appears fresh and unique about
it, to superficially disassociate its function and sense from a concurrent environment of activity, it
is much more difficult to detect the often exceedingly subtle way in which what appears as a
break from its context is always partly composed of a modified version of that outside and carries
that defining coloration and thematics within itself via its metaphoric structure. This is why
"...there can be no division between awareness and events that could supposely happen without
it"(Gendlin,2004,p.146).(Contrast this view with Neisser's(2006) model of unconscious
subjectivity). The influence of language, culture, memory and biological inheritance don't operate
behind the back of consciousness but are carried forward with it as an intricate implicatory
whole; in each moment this inheritance insinuates itself into but (this is very important) is
simultaneously and indissociably re-contextualized by its participation within and as the present
event (thus it is always a new variation of this inheritance which participates in the event).
An experienced event carries forward, knows and modifies one's entire history, leaving nothing
of the original behind. The way that each aspect of psychological functioning (including what
would be called intentional, bodily-sensate and intersubjective processes) implicates and belongs
inextricably to each other part, generates a dynamic network of intersections of intersections,
metaphors of metaphors, guaranteeing that the person as a whole always functions as an
implicatory unity at the very edge of experience. Consciousness, body and world intersect in this
single gesture, co-implicating continuity and qualitative transformation in such a way that
intentional experience maintains a unity which recognizes itself, at every moment, the 'same
differently'. Simply in struggling to write a single line of text on a page, such as what I've written
here, I find myself experiencing in oh so subtle a fashion a whole universe of moods, thoughts,
sensations , distractions that intervene to interrupt the supposed thematic continuity of the
writing. This I do in a shifting of attention in myriad ways from what is on a page to what is not
and everything in between; in a transit from awareness of conceptualization to sensation to
recollection to emotion to action to dreaming, when I seemingly lose my train of thought and,
succumbing to creative fatigue, find myself observing visual textures of my surroundings,
listening distractedly to ambient sounds, noting the touch of cool air blowing on my skin from a
fan. But how is this bouncing from mode to mode of awareness to be understood?
Gallagher(1998), echoing sentiments of other enactive cognitive researchers, understands
linguistic consciousness to be organized into separated fragments of schematized linear
narratives which jostle, interrupt and transform each other via parallel interactions. He says that
rather than simply being an "orderly successive flow" under conscious control, consciousness is a
"hodgepodge of multiple serialities that often disrupt one another"(p.194). I suggest it is not quite
either of the two. The apparent interruptedness and randomness of the multitude of
apprehensions intervening in the attempt to read the words you see on this page is not the
haphazard competing, clashing or inter-conditioning among schematically organized narrative
meanings. It is rather an integral temporal continuation of the already self-transforming thread
which constitutes the wandering thematics of my thesis. To be distracted from the narrative text
at hand is not to break with the peculiarly integral nature of moment to moment experience,
whose continuity is not that of an 'orderly successive flow ' if such an order is understood as
logical derivations of an already composed scheme. It is instead a carrying-forward which
re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending
the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity.
Thought has the feel of at the same time a completion and a thorough qualitative alteration not
just of what immediately preceded it, but of my entire history. My most precious and defining
superordinate concerns, including my core sense of myself in relation to my past and to others,
my ethical and spiritual beliefs, are implied, carried into and through (as always an absolutely
new version of them!) all situations and activities, an ongoing silent background which
participates implicitly in (and is simultaneously completely, if subtly, reinvented by) the meaning
of even my most trivial experiences. Simply to repeat a word, mark, gesture, object of sense
'identically' is to generate both a new sense of itself and a new philosophy of the world, of
myself, in some way (installing non-propositional reflectivity and interpretation at the very heart
of so-called pre-reflective self and inter-self-awareness).
(FOOTNOTE: See Gallagher(2005)Phenomenological Approaches to Self-consciousness, for a
sympathetic review of the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness in psychology and
philosophy.)
The otherness of culture intervenes in each supposed repetition of the `same' word, and this
comes from within that event's own resources as simultaneously empirical(introducing novelty)
and subjective(carrying forward my history), embodied and embedded before any conditioning
by a 'separate' outside, whether that outside be formulated as mind, body or world. No activity,
no matter how apparently trivial, redundant or solipsistic, fails to redefine in some small but
complete way my most global perspective of myself, leaving nothing left over of a would-be
original pre-noetic past to schematically control the present from behind and outside of it.
FOOTNOTE ON BLINDSIGHT:
Laura Chivers writes 'Blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between a lack of declarative
knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of correct answers to questions about the stimulus .
People suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to reach
spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli are present, and do not know
what objects look like. In this sense, they are blind. However, they are able to give correct
answers when asked to decide between given alternatives. Studies done with subjects who
exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to guess reliably only about certain features of
stimuli having to do with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to
discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way appropriate to grasping the object
when asked to try. Some may show color discrimination as well . Subjects also show visual
capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in light), implicit reactions and
voluntary responses.
People suffering from blindsight are not "blind" because their eyes do not function. Rather they
suffer from cortical blindness. People suffering from cortical blindness receive sensory
information but do not process it correctly, usually due to damage in some part of the brain. The
damage in blindsight patients has been shown to be in the striate cortex, which is part of the
visual cortex. The striate cortex is often called the primary visual cortex , and is thought to be the
primary locus of visual processing . Destruction or disconnection of the striate cortex produces a
scotoma, or a region of blindness, in the part of the visual field that maps to the damaged area of
the cortex . Depending on the extent of the lesion, vision can be absent in anywhere between a
very small section of stimulus field and the entire field . The person is unable to process the
sensory input to the striate cortex, and does not recognize having seen the object. '
Cognitive theorists conclude from clinical examples of blindsight that consciousness is only a
part of what goes on in the brain, and that consciousness is not needed for behavior. To argue
that blindsightedness is not an example of unconscious processing (experience occuring in
parallel with, but independent of conscious awareness) requires a new and different sensitivity to
content of experience, and to the understanding of awareness. If there is no 'feeling of seeing' in
blindsightedness, as is claimed, then there is feeling of a different sort, a quality of meaning that
is overlooked by contemporary approaches to cognition and affect because of its subtlety.
Familiarization with Gendlin's focusing techniques is one way to develop sensitivity to what for
most is a world they have never articulated. This is the important point; phenomena such as
blindsightedness evince not unconscious but inarticulate experience. One would need , of course,
to analyze the aspects of the experience in blindsightedness. One has before one a task involving
an intention to see, which implies the involvement of a certain concept of vision that the
perceiver expects to encounter.
If the claim for blindsightedness were simply that this experience involves a different aspect of
what is involved in seeing than one normally expects of a visual situation, (for instance, if one
expects contrast, color, perspective, one gets instead a vague or incipient meaning that is not
recognizable as seeing even though it in fact is normally part of all visual experiences), then I
would be in agreement. If, however, the claim is that whatever meaning or information is
prompting the blindsighted behavior is independent of the conscious experience(conscious and
unconscious events as independent, parallel meanings), then I disagree. My claim is that the
experience mistakenly called blindsight is an incipient or intuitive feel that is consciously,
intentionally-metaphorically continuous with the ongoing flow of awareness. Blindsightedness is
not an illustration of the partial independence of psychological subsystems, but of the fact that
the most primordial 'unit' of awareness is something other than , and more subtle, than either
contentful cognitive or empty affective identities. Just because something is not articulated does
not mean that it is not fully experienced.
The nature of the experience in blindsightedness would not be unlike the way that the 'same'
object that one observes over the course of a few seconds or minutes continues to be the 'same'
differently even though it is typically reported to be self-identical over that interval. A changing
sense of a thing is not noticed until it becomes an intense affect, and then it is ossified as an
abstract 'state'. From the perspective of awareness, cognitivism seems to order experiences
hierarchically, privileging what is considered conceptual content over affectivity by virtue of its
supposed repeatability, and valuing both of these over other events that are labeled unconscious
because they are assumed to be devoid of any conscious content. Blindsight involves a barely
discernable shift of sense in an ongoing experience of regularity. There would be not only
blindsight, but deaf-hearing, numb-tactility and non-conceptual conceptuality. The test of
consciousness of a thing:'Can one see that thing emerging from a field of perceived sameness?' is
wrongheaded because it doesn't recognize that the field of supposed sameness is already a
movement of changing meanings. The conscious-unconscious binary should be re-configured as
a spectrum of meaningfulness).
My Norms Are Not Your Norms:
Once the radically self-transformational, already fully 'social' character of so-called solitary
self-reflection is recognized, it becomes clear that my experiences of direct interaction with other
persons are but (categorically indistinct) extensions of this primary intersubjectivity. Thus, just as
in my private experience, in interacting with others in the world I do not rely on detached internal
schemes, in the form of a canned 'folk psychology'(Dennett) or theory of mind (Baron-Cohen), in
order to make the actions of others intelligible to me. Instead, interpersonal understanding, like
solitary reflection, is an on-the-fly, non-autonomous, contextually created process. A number of
cognitive researchers( Bruner, Gallagher, Ratcliffe, etc) may claim that their own critiques of
folk psychology and theory of mind approaches, guided by their advocacy of socially embedded
models of psychological processes, demonstrate their having moved beyond the essentialistic
tendencies I have cited in this paper .
Gallagher writes:" a set of cultural norms is learned through practice such that these become
second nature. By this means common expectations that are meant to apply to all, equally, are
established. By learning how I ought to behave in such and such a circumstance, I learn how you
ought to behave as well. And this supplies a ready guide to your behavior in so far as you do not
behave abnormally. Such learning does not take the form of internalizing explicit rules (at least
not as a set of theoretical propositions), nor does it depend on applying ones that are somehow
built-in sub-personally. It involves becoming accustomed to local norms, coming to embody
them, as it were, through habit and practice. " Ratcliffe(2007) suggests that "many thoughts,
interpretations and viewpoints ...belong to nobody in particular and are shared products of
interaction"(Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of
Mind and Simulation, Palgrave Macmillan, p..175).
In furtherance of this thinking of shared products of interaction, Gallagher embraces a notion of
socially distributed cognition. " What my initial individual intention might have been can change
through this communicative process into an intention that is not reducible to just my or your
individual intention. There's no problem here of speaking about a collectively formed intention.
But we can ask, "where" does a collectively formed intention reside? In our individual minds? Or
in what can be called a socially extended mind, or institution (Gallagher 2013), or what
Alessandro Duranti (2015) calls a socially distributed cognition (Duranti 2015: 219). Such
institutions go beyond individual cognitive processes or habits: they include communicative
practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions that generate actions,
preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed processes supported by artifacts, tools,
technologies, environments, institutional structures, etc."(The Narrative Sense of Others 2017
p467-473).
Notice that the claim by Gallagher and others that individual behavior in social situations is
guided by narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints implies the belief
that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular
community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an
impersonal expressive agency . This is not to say that these accounts deny any role to individual
psychological history in the reception of social signs, only that such accounts allow for a sort of
cobbling , mapping, mirroring or co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in
which the 'joints' of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are treated as
pre-metaphorical objects-in-themselves. That social interaction for these writers depends on a
grafting of one content onto another is suggested by the argument(Gallagher and Hutto(in press),
Ratcliffe(2007), Gopnick and Mettzoff(1997)) that linguistic-cultural intersubjectivity is derived
from a more primary intersubjectivity , an innately structured 'intermodal tie' between one's
proprioceptive bodily feedback and one's perception of another that is supposedly direct and
unmediated. Gallagher cites mirror neuron studies in support of the view that "we innately map
the visually perceived motions of others onto our own kinesthetic sensations"(Gopnick and
Metzoff ,1997,p.129).
I maintain that what is implicated for me in an interpersonal social situation is not `the' social
forms as shared homunculi, based on what Gallagher calls a 'common body intentionality'
between perceived and perceiver, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which one
could say are unique to the implicative thrust of my own construing, belonging to me in a fashion
that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity.
For even the most apparently trivial cultural routine (getting on a plane, ordering in a restaurant),
what I perceive as socially `permitted', 'constrained', 'regulated' or 'normed' behavior and
understanding of signs is already qualitatively distinctive in relation to what other participants
recognize. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political
collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative
to their own history(which is itself reshaped by its participation in these situations) , even when
they believe that their interpersonal interactions are guided by the constraints imposed by
essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their language community.
I'm aware that this resistance of my thinking to would-be interpersonal norms risks being misread
as a retreat from a model of full social embeddedness into a person-centered solipsistic
essentialism of rule-based mental modules. In fact, Gallagher misconstrues Heidegger's Beingin-
the world, which I embrace as an ally in the deconstruction of embodied intersubjectivity, as a
deficient pragmatic formalization depriving one of a direct exposure to the world. Gallagher
argues that the perception-based relationships of primary intersubjectivity are more direct than
the 'pragmatic contexts' of what he understands as 'secondary intersubjectivity' that determine
meaning for Heidegger.
"Trevarthan's developmental concept of secondary intersubjectivity was already foreshadowed by
the phenomenological analyses of Heidegger (1968) and Gurwitsch (1931), and these are
analyses that have also been taken up by Dreyfus. Understanding the meaning of something is
dependent on pragmatic contexts. Aron Gurwitsch, following Heidegger's analysis of equipment
and circumspective engagement with the surrounding environment, and the larger action contexts
of human existence, indicates that our understanding of the other's expressive movements
depends on meaningful instrumental/pragmatic contexts. Things and situations provide scaffolds
for understanding the actions of others - and in those pragmatic contexts we see and come to
learn and imitate what they do. For both Heidegger and Gurwitsch, our encounters with others
are primarily through these pragmatic contexts. In effect, they overlook the effects of primary
intersubjectivity which give us a more direct, perception-based relationship with others.
Accordingly, they give priority to the pragmatic as a basis for the social - other people appear
with meaning only on the basis of pragmatic contexts. As Gurwitsch puts it, 'we continuously
encounter fellow human beings in a determined horizon. â |' (1931, p. 36).
'In these horizonal situations the "co-included" others appear. That they come to light in this
situation, and are not "near by" or "merely beside" it, signifies that they appear as belonging to
the situation in their specific roles and functions' (p. 97). Here Gurwitsch suggests that our
understanding of others is from the beginning framed in terms of the roles that they play in
relation to our projects. 'But it is always a matter of a person in his role. Understanding is yielded
here by virtue of the situation and is, therefore, limited to what is inherent in it' (p. 114). For
Trevarthan, and for several phenomenologists (other than Heidegger and Gurwitsch), however,
secondary intersubjectivity is dependent upon the development of primary intersubjectivity.
Primary intersubjectivity characterizes infancy but continues to be primary in terms of how we
interact with others. We perceive the intentions of others - their meaning - in the embodied
expression of movements, gestures, facial expression, and so forth.
These primary intersubjective processes are based on what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls
intercorporeality - a natural interaction of bodies that generates meaning in so far as we see the
intentions of others in their expressive movements. I live in the facial expressions of the other, as
I feel him living in mine â |(Merleau-Ponty, 2003, p. 218). The very first of all cultural objects,
and the one by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of
behavior (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 348). Primary and secondary intersubjectivities together give
us access to a shared world, and allow us to enter into its meaning in a pragmatic way. Insofar as
I have sensory functions â | I am already in communication with others â |. No sooner has my
gaze fallen upon a living body in the process of acting than the objects surrounding it
immediately take on a fresh layer of significance (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 353)."
(Gallagher:Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom).
When Gallagher reads Heidegger saying that Dasein is Being-with even if there are no others in
the world, he sees this as a solipsism, because Gallagher's intersubjective model is a relating of
bodies, understood as auto-affecting self-presences. Heidegger and Derrida locate a dehiscience
within auto-affection, dividing the concept of body before it can simply be itself as identity. An
identity is already a 'difference from itself' , Being as Being-with, and so is the origin of the
social , before other bodies. At the same time this self-dehiscience is a 'belongingness to what it
differs from'. What Gallagher sees as direct personal contact in the form of primary
intersubjectivity is, on a certain reading of Heidegger, the product of a derived abstraction
subsisting in the cobbling of identities.
Eugene Gendlin's re-envisioning of the body as radical interaffecting, thinking along with
Heidegger's Being-with, locates the genesis of meaning-making as always beyond the reach of
normative socially distributed narrative processes. "We can speak freshly because our bodily
situation is always different and much more intricate than the cultural generalities. A situation is
a bodily happening, not just generalities. Language doesn't consist just of standard sayings.
Language is part of the human body's implying of behaviour possibilities. Our own situation
always consists of more intricate implyings. Our situation implies much more than the cultural
kinds. The usual view is mistaken, that the individual can do no more than choose among the
cultural scenarios, or add mere nuances. The 'nuances' are not mere details. Since what is
culturally appropriate has only a general meaning, it is the so-called 'nuances' that tell us what we
really want to know. They indicate what the standard saying really means here, this time, from
this person.
Speech coming directly from implicit understanding is trans-cultural. Every individual
incorporates but far transcends culture, as becomes evident from direct reference. Thinking is
both individual and social. The current theory of a one-way determination by society is too
simple. The relation is much more complex. Individuals do require channels of information,
public discourses, instruments and machines, economic support, and associations for action. The
individual must also find ways to relate to the public attitudes so as to be neither captured nor
isolated. In all these ways the individual is highly controlled. Nevertheless, individual thinking
constantly exceeds society."
For Heidegger, Derrida, Gendlin and myself, the radically inseparable interaffecting between my
history and new experience exposes me to the world in an immediate, constant and
thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of my sense of myself and
others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via a narrative conception of socialization. I
am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply person-specific rather than located
intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before there is a pre-reflective personal 'I'
or interpersonal 'we', there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social
site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human
action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings.
The Meaning of Feeling:
How can I more precisely convey the nature of this process, this world of integrally and
holistically interaffecting texturizations which I say operates from within and exceeds what have
been assumed as the irreducible units of bio-psycho-social meanings? I believe it is not possible
to adequately grasp its dynamics without coming to terms with its central character as 'felt' or
affective. What do I mean here by feeling? The notion I have in mind involves bringing together
in a new way traditional understandings of thought and affect. I am certainly not alone in
advocating a view of affect and cognition as inseparable processes. While more traditional
approaches in philosophy and psychology treated affective phenomena as at best peripheral to,
and typically disruptive of, rational processes, embodied cognitive theories such as those of
Panksepp(1998), Damasio(2000), Varela(1999b), Johnson(1993), Ratcliffe(2002), Colombetti
and Thompson(2006) and Ellis(1995), take pains to present emotion and thought as an
indissociable interaction. According to current accounts, cognitive and affective processes are
closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at
multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world .
According to the newer thinking, affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As
Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, "moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged
theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether
theoretical or practical"(p.290). In affecting reason, feeling affects itself.
I am in agreement with these sentiments, as far as they go. However, I am prevented from
enlisting the aid of these ideas in support of my own position by my suspicion that the supposed
inseparable relation between reason and affect functions for these writers as a polarity between
cognitive states and affective activations, analogously to the treatment of the operations of
metaphor I discussed earlier in this paper. In other words, I am fearful that their conceptualization
of the role of affect may uphold the very idea of homucular identity that my notion of feeling is
meant to undermine, thereby acting as a monumental obstacle to grasping a more radical account
of affectivity. In any case, the weight of entrenched suppositions burdening the topic of feeling
must be lifted in order to illuminate the delicate terrain I am aiming at. It is therefore crucial that
I address commonalities among these accounts before I can mark out a route from their thinking
to mine. Let me begin with Francisco Varela's characterization of affect.
Varela(1999b) suggests that affective dynamics initiate gestalt shifts in thought and action.
Unlike older views, for Varela intentionality is not assumed to rely on an outside mechanism in
order to stir itself into motion. Nevertheless, cognition still relies on such intervention in order to
significantly change its direction of movement. The general understanding Varela indicates of the
relation between affective movement and the thinking which it affects seems to depend on the
idea of emotion as the change of a temporarily persisting stance (scheme, state, dispositional
attitude). Conceptual narratives are assumed to have a self-perpetuating schematic tendency
about them, requiring outside intervention from time to time to produce qualitative change. The
processes within a living system, including psychological functions, cannot be counted on to be
intrinsically transformational in a way that is optimally adaptive, but must be channelized into
changes in direction of action and conceptualization by extrinsic motivating sources.
We find a similar account of the role of emotion in Ratcliffe's(2002) synthesis of Heidegger and
neurophysiology. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are "'incorporated as essential
components in cognition", but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; "...emotions and
moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition"(p.299). They
originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can
'conflict' and emotion can "override cognitive judgement"(p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran's
clinical observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental
information which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe
attribute this behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe
concludes from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are
presumed to pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative's
resistances where weaker percepts from the environment cannot.
It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe and Varela, intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of
thought, but emotion, as valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. They are
apparenty not able to find the resources strictly within what they think of as intentional thought to
de-center thinking processes, because they treat cognition as tending to form temporarily
self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So
they rely on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled
cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of
emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and
meaning.
(FOOTNOTE:For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the
interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an
ongoing context. Ratcliffe(2002) cites Ramachandran's account of individuals with Capgras
syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously
experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)
Ratcliffe(2002) asserts: "Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent
interpretations of events..."(p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably
linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between
pre-existing states than a more radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling
originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action
readiness circuits that, Panksepp(1998) claims, are "completely biological and affective but...,
through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become]
inextricably mixed with learning and world events"(p.303).
For all their differences, I claim that Ratcliffe and Varela share with other contemporary accounts
of affect and emotion what I call the 'adaptationist' presumption that meaning is shaped in a
semi-arbitrary way by inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside. The same
assumption determining the structuration of metaphoric intentionality, the relation between
consciousness and the unconscious, and even narrative intersubjectivity as arbitrary mapping,
mirroring or conditioning functions between literal, schematic states, guides the relation between
affect and perception-conception. Damasio(2000) puts it this way: "...as a result of powerful
learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades eventually help connect
homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and objects in our
autobiographical experience"(p.54). According to this thinking, physiological processes of
feeling adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment, authorizing
adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins.
Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is linked to a milieu outside of itself (cognition) and with
which the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being
made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive mutations. There is a partial
independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The
cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.
Damasio(2000) summarizes:
Emotions are curious adaptations that are part and parcel of the machinery with which organisms
regulate survival. In short, for certain classes of clearly dangerous or clearly valuable stimuli in
the internal or external environment, evolution has assembled a matching answer in the form of
emotion"(p.54).
In sum, with regard to affectivity, Ratcliffe, Varela, Panksepp and Damasio appear to treat as
reified content what could be better understood as transformative process. Hypostasizing and
abstracting the intricate movement of experiencing into emotion `signals' and self-perpetuating
narratives, relating to each other in quasi-arbitrary brain-body interactions, misses the internal
integrity of meaning processes. An emotion viewed as a schematic signal or cue originating
outside of cognition can only be presumed to significantly modify and structure cognitive
meaning if one profoundly under-appreciates a more primary mobility structuring (and
exceeding) so-called cognitive control from within itself. Specifically, what confirms and
reinforces a thinking also always alters the direction and sense of that thinking in a subtle but
global way. So-called symbolic processes find their meaning reshaped well before any exposure
to a separate bodily, conceptual or interpersonal outside. By the same token, what would be
considered transformational or disturbing to a particular way of thinking could only have sense
relative to the orientation of that thinking itself; any modifications of thinking would have to
emerge out of the resources of that thinking in a way that preserved an always ongoing integrity
and implicatory self-consistency in the movement of experience. What disturbs a perspective
belongs to it; the disturbance is born intimately from it. In intending, I am not simply being
directed toward 'objects', in the sense of revisiting something that was already there. Experiences
don't come at me, they unfold from me and into each other as both a carrying forward of an
intentional thematic and a subtle, but global, re-defining of me(and them).
I believe what is needed is a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute
alterity, the so-called pre-reflective and the reflective, in the same structure, the same moment.
Not a model which looks for the impetus for subversive novelty in supposed effects which are
grafted onto and condition states of meaning from outside of them, but as the very core of an
event. Let us, then, venture the following definition of affect, applying to such terms as emotion,
feeling and desire as well: Every experienced event of any kind (perceptual, conceptual,
bodily-sensory) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning is an
advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a
background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames the activity as a whole, as "a kind of
cradle within which cognition rests"(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296), but in that each moment of
engagement is an inseparable interbleeding between the continuation (not as a duplicative
representation but as an already modified version) of a prior context of attunement or thematics,
and a change in that atunement. This implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions
supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:
1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction,
by extrinsic (pre-noetic) forces. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically affective
(self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive, 'rational', reflective type of
awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral empirical accounts, qualitatively,
intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it references. Feelings belong to, operate
within, carry forward, and transform what are called conceptual meanings even before any
specific experience of bodily activitation. This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to
moment experience is often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical
stability and inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly
self-perpetuating coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing
pre-reflective self-awareness.
2) 'Raw' affect is an intrinsically (non-representational, non-propositional) reflective
intentionality. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only manifest the characteristics of
metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated with conceptual thought, but in
fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been called conceptual meaning in any
stable way.
Let me elaborate on my first assertion. What do I mean by my claim that what has been called
symbolic, rational thought is inherently qualitatively transformational? What finer, more mobile
process may be obscured by current notions of linguistic reasoning? Penetrating the veil of the
homuncular permeating our language of the things within us and around us is not a matter of
discovering smaller, faster, dumber, more interactive 'bits' within the units of current approaches,
for that would simply displace the issues we've discussed onto a miniaturized scale. It is a matter
of revealing perhaps an entirely different notion of the basis of entities than that of the
freeze-frame state. This is where a finely-tuned detection of feeling-in-thought becomes crucial.
Many researchers may agree that, even apart from the specific contribution of the body as they
understand it, intentional entities have a qualitative 'feel' in the sense of representing a meaning
which is in some measure unique to the individual('the feeling of what it is like'). It is widely
understood today (see Putnam(1990)) that objective fact and subjective valuation are inseparably
intertwined such that an inter-subjective, third person science can never entirely eliminate
interpretive gaps in communication. I am trying to convey a different way of understanding the
'feel' of things than this idea of a supposedly 'pre-reflective' self-awareness of qualitative
meaning. What I have in mind is a notion of feeling which combines and redetermines current
understandings of thought, affect and expression.
Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, this idea of feeling as
event has its entire effect exhausted in its being just barely more than itself, as just the most
insignificant and gentle whiff, feel, tinge of novelty. Within and beyond such terms as cognitive
states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of barely self-exceeding accents, modulations,
aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but modulations
of modulations.
(FOOTNOTE: This should not be confused with Husserl's perspectival variations in the
perception of an object . It is not just in 'deliberately' reflecting upon or changing position with
respect to perceptual entities that we modify their content; I suggest that even a certain
phenomenological notion of pre-reflective perceptual self-awareness may amount to an
abstraction derived from, but blind to, an intricate fabric of contingent reflective change WITHIN
the space of a so-called perceptual aspect.)
The subpersonal, personal and interpersonal worlds generated from (but never overtaking) this
intricate process may be clumsily described via the 'homuncular' terminology of patterned
interactions between discrete parts, but at the cost of missing the profound ongoing internal
relatedness and immediacy of this underlying, overflowing movement.
Count from one to ten and discover how the intent and meaning of this supposed repetition of
identical increments shifts in very subtle ways as soon as you begin . Look at the period at the
end of this sentence. Notice how the feel, the sense of it (and you) changes immediately and
constantly as you continue to gaze as it for a few moments. Can you sense-feel this 'it'
undergoing change not as a series of different freeze frame states ('what it is') but as
self-exceedings of self-exceedings('how it changes'), trans-formations without form? Even the
most momentary identification of a so-called state conceals a whole journey of feeling
transformations, colorations, hedonic tonalities, remaking each moment my entire past (bodily,
linguistic, cultural) along with my whole sense of myself. Yet we name this auto-multiplication
'a' sign .
In doing so are we painting a whole vicinity of varying affective textures with one brush? No, the
brush itself is experienced implicitly AS this multiplicity even when we are not explicitly aware
that we are accessing more than a uniform state. It is precisely the way that a name, a sign
continues to be the same differently (meaning that what IT is, and who WE are, is utterly and
completely transformed, but in the most exquisitely subtle way, moment to moment, and
WITHIN a single instantaneous moment) in our experience of it that allows us to see a name,
sign, concept, percept as an apparent unity across these changes, and to communicate it to
someone else the same differently as further developments of it, and they to receive the
information from us the same differently as even further self-variations, and share it
interpersonally, empirically, 'objectively', the same differently (I suggest that the precision of
science, as well as the illusion of a constant, pre-reflective self-awareness, rests on this mobile
continuity within, between and beyond so-called signs). To overtly RECOGNIZE what had
traditionally been assumed as a unity as this ever-developing multiplicity is not to go from stasis
to motion but to FURTHER ENRICH an already ongoing process.
Now my second point may become clearer . I asserted that affect is an intrinsically
(non-propositional) reflective, quasi-thematically unfolding intentionality. My depiction of the
little 'I' implied by a concept as an illusionary effect of an intricate texturizing sequence of
affective variations of variations, metaphors of metaphors, gently reinventing itself and me (and
undermining, from within itself, the alleged constancy of 'pre-reflective' self-awareness) moment
to moment the same differently, establishes a gentle tapestry of feeling transformations as the
hidden basis of what have been called concepts, BEFORE the participation of specific bodily
sensation. And when an evolving situation brings into play the experience of bodily affects, such
activations don't add any special capacities of hedonic-aesthetic feeling not already involved in
the utterly contextual structuration of thought from the start. What so-called specific bodily
sensation contributes is a meaningful quasi-thematic elaboration of the already richly felt,
globally self-transforming, fully embodied-embedded unfolding of intentional experience.
If feeling, understood this new way, IS the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual
thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the pre-noetic
and the noetic, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial independence of rationality and
affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects inherent in each event. The
interaffecting of context and novelty which defines an event simultaneously produces a fresh,
particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique momentum (hedonic
component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valuative, hedonic (the perceived
goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying 'non-emotional'
appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply IS our vicissitudes of momentum of
sense-making through new situations, rather than arising from the content of special objects.
Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations
and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how effectively we are able to
anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move through, new
experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum, ranging from the
confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative movement, is
intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute the origin of aesthetic pleasures
and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like bodily affects, even if it is
understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long in psychology .
(FOOTNOTE:Damasio(1996) writes:
We came to life with a preorganized mechanism to give us the experiences of pain and of
pleasure. Culture and individual history may change the threshold at which it begins to be
triggered, or its intensity, or provide us with means to dampen it. But the essential device is a
given(p.264).
While I agree with Damasio that the capacity for physical and emotional sensation is certainly
dependent upon the existence of particular physiological structures, I suggest that the actual
functioning of pain and pleasure is not the production of any sort of pre-existing device or
content, but is instead the purely contextual expression of the rhythms of momentum of
organismic experiencing.)
From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often
appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or
accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence.
When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively
enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately
disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species
apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal,
energy) invading, conditioning and structuring perceptual and conceptual thought from without
as a background field. It is said that such 'raw' or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological,
pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we
are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and
gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations
have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, non-aesthetic.
However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus reflective, voluntary versus
involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as
interacting states of being; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually
unfolding process which is always, at the same time, within the same event, intentional-reflective
and intuitive-affective.
Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a 'cognitive' appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation,
movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily
sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes(even when treated as mutually
structuring each other via 'intentional-affective' syntheses) which I am questioning.The point isn't
that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous system
and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of emotion, but
that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called conceptual appraisal or bodily
sensation, the phenomenological scene of emotion(or any other aspect of bio-psycho-social
functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual conditioning between
discrete components. Prinz(2004), Colombetti and Thompson(2006), Damasio(1999) and others
deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the feeling of emotion is
affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of connection with the
body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what are called cognitive
and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I want to turn their
views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a spatial locale and
repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body, as a separate
locale with semi-independent contents.
I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect
is intentional. But if both the former and latter are true , it is not because body sensation
structures cognition(or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but
inadequately formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the
intentional prior to any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could
speak of the occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a
background field of physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to
re-figure all of these modes, what would be referred to as the "motoric", the "sensate", the
"cognitive", as unstable metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the
course of an indissociably reflective-affective global movement of experience which would
imply the unraveling of the basis of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding
of these terms.
When I am frightened, whether I focus on my attitude toward the world, my rapid heartbeat, my
facial expression or bodily preparation for action, each of these aspects emerge out of each other
as a fully reflective, metaphoric carrying forward and further transforming of the deepening
implications of this tentative, confused situation. All these aspects already belong to, and in fact
have their meaning ENTIRELY defined as variations-continuations of the thematic unfolding of
my sense of the emerging threat, subtly remaking my entire past while always maintaining a
sense, no matter how surprising, unpredictable or disturbing a new present appears, of
implicatory belonging to this prior history.
Intermingled with my wandering in and out of significant shifts in experiential momentum, from
doubts, terrors, and confusions to later confidences and contentments, will be more subtly
self-transforming moments whose continual intuitive shifts of meaning, purpose and affective
momentum are hidden so effectively that it may fool me into believing that this more plodding
progress of comprhension represents the appearance of a different species from that of
pronounced feeling, the realm of affectively neutral (or constant) cognitive states. However, such
entities as narrative schemes and conceptual forms may in fact have no actual status other than as
empty abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms,
immediately and unknowingly transform the hedonically felt senses operating within (and
defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways. Feeling, the event, the interbleeding of
subject and object, transformation without form: all of these terms reference the same irreducible
'unit' of experience, concealed by but overrunning what symbols, bits, assemblies, bodies, frames
and other states are supposed to do. A 'single' sign (whether so-called conceptual or
bodily-affective) is already a panoply of intimately changing variations and momenta of felt
meanings, in(as) the instant it is accessed, infusing the allegedly conceptual with feeling (and the
sensate with intentionality) from within its very core, embodied before any consultation with a
separate bodily 'outside'.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I suppose the coherence of this paper's claims concerning metaphor, the relation
between consciousness and the unconscious, the basis of interpersonal understanding, cognition
and emotion ultimately hinges on the reader's detection of what I have inadequately described
here as a world of integrally and globally inter-affecting textures of felt sense-making hidden
within, and functioning beyond, what have been assumed as the irreducible units of
bio-psycho-social meaning. FOOTNOTE: Gendlin(1991) has named this more-than-conceptual
realm 'the implicit intricacy'. An interesting difference in our approaches is that, according to
Gendlin, concepts and this wider experiential intricacy depend on each other. I suggest, instead,
that what are called concepts are but an illusory effect of the more fundamental process of
experiencing.
Leaving aside many other questions left unanswered by my very preliminary sketch, I anticipate
that resistance on the part of readers to entertaining the possibility of a fine realm of experience
alleging itself to be both more intrinsically self-transformative and implicatively self-consistent
than current views allow for will be tied less to its transformative impetus than its integrative
aspect. That is, the claim for the sort of intricate order I have been making cannot fail to arouse
the suspicion that, despite my protestations, a closet irealism, idealism or subjectivism must be
operating behind the scenes to justify the radically implicative internal belonging I have
emphasized for this perspective. To the anticipated charge of essentialism I can only answer that,
from my vantage, it is current psychologies which appear burdened with the weight of an
idealism: their belief in temporary discrete states stifles the intimately interactive potential of
their embodied, embedded approaches, by making the whole works dependent on irreducible
units of formal resistance and polarization.
Events understood as interaffectings of interaffectings, working within and beyond relations
among presumed temporary essences (conceptual, affective-bodily, interpersonal), do not achieve
their gentle integrative continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, they
simply lack the formidability of static identity necessary to impose the arbitrariness of
conditioning, mapping, mirroring, grafting and cobbling, on the movement of experiential
process.
(FOOTNOTE:The focus of this article being psychological texts, I have made little mention of
philosophers in the phenomenological tradition such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger,
whose writing has been increasingly appreciated as anticipating recent trends in psychological
theorizing. The case can also be made that the post-structuralist philosophies of Lyotard, Derrida
and Deleuze have strong resonances with the overarching aims of current psychologies(See
Gallagher(1997),(1998), Lyotard(1991)). Gendlin's (1985), (1991) critiques of many of these
philosophers supports my contention that none of these authors are immune to the homuncular
critique I present in this paper.)
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FOOTNOTE ON DRIVING A CAR:
What takes place during absent-minded driving? What is the `good thing' if there is any, about
what cognitivists characterize as automatic, unconscious or unattended to actions? What is the
proper analogy to be used here?
First of all, we have to understand that each freshly experienced event already addresses the
entirely of what came before it in the sense that the meaning of any individual awareness is
nothing but the qualitative modification of what immediately preceded it in awareness. (And
even speaking of something being `IN' awareness gives the wrong impression, since sensing is
not a place or region alongside other regions). This being the case, an action, thought, perception
carries forward and knows one's entire history.
Motor behaviors associated with driving belong to the same text as thoughts seemingly having
nothing to do with the act of driving when operating a car. Whether one seemingly interrupts
one's daydreaming in order to focus on one's movements at the wheel or to attend to the visual
scene of road and signs up ahead, or has no memory of having paid attention to those movements
or visual scene, in either case the movements and visual scene further the daydreaming and
vice-versa. Cognitive theories of unconscious, automatic gestures in driving, or seeming absence
of conscious awareness of the visual scene one has just driven through, rely on the notion of a
schema whose meaning is a independent of whatever it is one is claiming to be attending to. In
other words, if one aspect of mentation is apparently not concerning itself with the schematic
processing of kinesthetic-motor aspects of driving, then another aspect of mentation is doing the
job independently of the first. But what we need to understand is that the meaning of the
visuo-spatial landscape in front of us, or motor schema that appears to us to be out of conscious
awareness as we drive absent-mindedly, even though we obviously must have processed the
details of the road at some level, is not at all processed independently of what we remember
attending to. The meaning of the landscape and one's movements BECOME whatever one is
daydreaming about. That is to say, they further, elaborate the day-dream , but in a form that
makes it difficult for us to tease these task-related aspects of the situation apart from the
absent-minded day-dreaming activity.
These visual, kinesthetic and sensory-motor events that seem hidden to us in absent-mindedness
are the continuance of, belong to the conceptual, reflective, recollective thought of the
day-dreaming mode of attention, and vice-versa.
When one performs a so-called well learned activity, such as rollerblading, typing or driving, it
seems as though one pares down the repertoire of consciously selected choreography, that one
telegraphs a whole complex of movements (which initially needed to be performed effortfully,
consciously, sequentially) via a highly condensed set of intended patterns. But one need not think
of these intended patterns as meta-commands, that is, as elegant scaffolding covering a complex
suborganization of invisible, automated motor skills. The `well' learned' skill isn't enjoyable
because of something supposedly behind or under it, but because of what it is in itself, namely, a
fluid and rich unfolding of self-referential change. Generally, when one says that one has `paid
attention to the driving' on one occasion and not another, he is really saying that he has paid
attention to additional features of the visual scene, or his own movements, beyond that necessary
for a direct contribution to the driving itself.
If one crashes as a result of daydreaming while driving, it is not necessary to conclude that this
indicates a dis-coordination between a prior schematic constraint and one's cognitive processes.
An accident does not represent a failure of coordination between two temporally co-present
systems or realities.
The actions we think of as automatic and unconscious when we perform a well-learn task like
driving a car are in fact NOT unavailable to explicit conscious attention. Like the example of
blindsight, they represent a kind of TRANSFORMED awareness, wherein we only conclude that
our performance has been guided by unseen processes of thought because we are looking for the
sorts of separated, labored actions that characterized our behaviors when we were first learning to
master the driving of a car. But the well-learned behaviors implicated in so-called 'automatic'
driving are explicit awarenesses whose meaning is now oriented around, and imbedded within,
the parts of a scene we have more obvious awareness of as we drive(the scenery, what's on the
radio, our thoughts about work, conversation with passengers). To say that these well-learned
actions are embedded within current awareness is not to imply that they are hidden. Rather, they
are SUBTLE aspects of our experience that are easily missed. There are many, many behaviors
like these which belong to our explicit attention which we don't recognize as such.
As I wrote about blindsight, if there is no 'feeling of attention' to the movements involved in
well-learned driving, as is claimed, then there is feeling of a different sort, a quality of meaning
that is overlooked by contemporary approaches to cognition and affect because of its subtlety.
Familiarization with Gendlin's focusing techniques is one way to develop sensitivity to what for
most is a world they have never articulated. This is the important point; phenomena such as the
actions of well-learned driving evince not unconscious but inarticulate experience. One would
need , of course, to analyze the aspects of the experience in driving. When a person is asked to
recall their awareness of actions in driving, they have before them a task involving the
expectation of a certain concept of kinesthetic experience.
If the claim for the unconsciousness of driving were simply that this experience involves a
different aspect of what is involved in experiencing one's movements than one normally expects
of such a situation, (for instance, if I expect to identify the flexing of muscle groups and the
feedback from the steering wheel and pedals on my skin and joints, I have to settle instead for an
incipient meaning that would not be recognizable as kinesthetic feedback, but rather serves as a
metaphoric elaboration of whatever I AM focusing on while driving), then I would be in
agreement. If, however, the claim is that whatever actions are guiding the behavior of driving is
independent of the conscious experience(conscious and unconscious events as independent,
parallel meanings), then I disagree.
My claim is that the experience mistakenly called unconscious driving is an incipient or intuitive
feel that is consciously, intentionally-metaphorically continuous with the ongoing flow of
awareness. Well-learned drving is not an illustration of the partial independence of psychological
subsystems, but of the fact that the most primordial 'unit' of awareness is something other than ,
and more subtle, than either contentful cognitive or empty affective identities. Just because
something is not articulated does not mean that it is not fully experienced.
Return to index
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Heidegger, Derrida and Gendlin on Structure, Form and State.
As a subject constructs and organizes an object via a valuative account, the object is conditioned
by this subjective activity. But if that were the end of it, we would not move past Kant's
conditions of possibility. The subject must in turn be reciprocally conditioned by the object. The
object grounded by the subject and the subject grounded by the object is a non-grounded
grounding, or more precisely, an activity of reciprocal transformation. Philosophers in the post
Hegel era, from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, have recognized that Being, if it is to overcome
metaphysics, must take into account, imply, differentiate from, structural beings while not being
a structure itself. Heidegger was committed to forging a path of thinking integrating, without
succumbing to, the dominant philosophical traditions of the 20th century(dialectical and
Neo-Kantian subjectivism and positivist empiricism). Heidegger laid the groundwork for this
path in Being and Time.
Being distinguishes itself as the unity of the mutual carrying out and trans-formative nature of
beings-being. BT's challenge was to formulate the Ontological-Ontic Difference in such a way as
to avoid rendering Being as grounding condition of possibility for beings, as unconditioned
master concept, a first principle. Via the ontological difference, "Being grounds beings, and
beings, as what IS most of all, account for Being. One comes over the other, one arrives in the
other. Overwhelming and arrival appear in each other" (Heidegger, Identity and Difference).
With the era initiated by the Kehre, Heidegger further developed a way to think the overcoming
of the self-contradiction of a grounding concept that seeks to overcome objectification. Ereignis
performs the unity of the difference between Being and Beings as differentiating event.
If Heideggerian Being takes into account, implies, differentiates from, structural beings while not
being a structure itself, what does it mean for beings to 'have a structure'? Words like rote and
mechanical depict the effects of structure as generator of process of repetition of a dominating
theme. And this is what many scholars target in Heidegger's critique of technology and Gestell.
But what is a structure in and of itself, prior to and outside of its production-reproduction? What
is the meaning of structure as momentary state, before it is thought as programmatic process, as
conversion, formulaic self-unfolding?
Writers endorsing a general account of meaning as non-recuperable or non-coincidental from one
instantiation to the next may nonetheless treat the heterogeneous contacts between instants of
experience as transformations of fleeting forms, states, logics, structures, outlines, surfaces,
presences, organizations, patterns, procedures, frames, standpoints. When thought as pattern, the
structural-transcendental moment of eventness upholds a certain logic of internal relation; the
elements of the configuration mutually signify each other and the structure presents itself as a
fleeting identity, a gathered field. The particularity of eventness is not allowed to split the
presumed (temporary) identity of the internal configuration that defines the structure as structure.
History would be the endless reframing of a frame, the infinite shifting from paradigm to
paradigm.
It is this presumed schematic internality of eventness, the power of abstractive multiplicity given
to the sign, which causes experience to be treated as resistant to its dislocation, as a lingering or
resistant form, pattern, configuration, infrastructure. Of the numerous philosophers since Hegel
who have attempted to resuce the subject-object scheme-content relation from metaphysical
domination(Kierkegaard, Gadmaer, Levinas, Nietzsche), Heidegger and Derrida are the first to
question and dismantle the very possibility of structure-pattern-scheme as subject or object. How
so?
Let us examine the phenomenon of structure more closely. How is structure composed? What is
the structurality of structure? Contemporary philosophical thinking outside of Heidegger and
Derrida tends to think the spatial frame of structure as enclosure of co-present elements. It is an
internality, full presence, a resting in itself and an auto-affection. Structure would be a pattern
framing a finite array of elements . It would be a system of classification, a vector or center of
organization. We can think pattern in abstract(the structure of democracy) or concrete( the
structure of a house) terms. A structure has properties in the minimal sense that it is defined by
its center, that which organizes and, determines it thematically as that which is the bearer of its
attributes, that according to which its elements are aligned. Structure is plurality of the identical.
If a structure is an organization of elements, those elements themselves are structures. The object
is structure in that it is self-presence, its turning back to itself in order to be itself as presence,
subsistence, auto-affection, the 'this as itself'. Therefore structure would be irreducible. It would
be the primordial basis of beings as objects (point of presence, fixed origin) as internality, space
as frame, subsistence, pure auto-affection, representation , category, law, self-presence itself.
Also value, will, norm. So much rides on where we begin from in thinking about beginnings.
In various writings Derrida deconstructs the notion of structure. He argues that structure implies
center, and at the center, transformation of elements is forbidden. But he says in fact there is no
center, just the desire for center. If there is no center, there is no such singular thing as structure,
only the decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. "Henceforth, it was necessary to
begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a
present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a
sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a
center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say,
a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never
absolutely present outside a system of differences."(Sign, Structure and Play, Writing and
Difference p352)
"The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account
that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other
elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is
differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits
each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the
remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential
structure escaping the logic of presence..(Limited Inc p53)."
In their essence, Beings don't HAVE structure or constitution. There is no such THING as a
form, a structure, a state. There is no trans-formation but rather a trans-differentiation,
(transformation without form, articulation as dislocation) What is being transcended is not form
but difference. Each of the elements in the array that define a structure are differences .They do
not belong to a structure . They are their own differentiation. There is no gathering, cobbling ,
synthesis, relating together, only a repetition of differentiation such that what would have been
called a form or structure is a being the same differently from one to the next. Not a simultaneity
but a sequence. So one could not say that form of nature is the way in which nature transitions
through and places itself into the forms and states that, from a schematic perspective, constitute
the path of its movement, and nature turns into natural things, and vice versa. Nature would not
transition through forms and states, Nature, as difference itself, transitions though differential
transitions. Differences are not forms. Forms are enclosures of elements organized according to a
rule. Forms give direction. Difference does not give direction, it only changes direction. What are
commonly called forms are a temporally unfolding system of differences with no organizing rule,
no temporary 'it'. The transformation is from one differential to the next before one ever gets to a
form.
Schemes, conceptual, forms, intentions, willings have no actual status other than as empty ontic
abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms,
immediately and unknowingly transform the senses operating within (and defining) such
abstractions in subtle but global ways concealed by but overrunning what ontically understood
symbols, bits, assemblies, bodies, frames and other states are supposed to be , even if (and
especially when) Ereignis as transformative event names the overturning of being as Ge-stell.
The briefest identification of a so-called state is an unknowing experiencing of temporally
unfolding multiplicity of differences. This is the ontological being of the ontic notion of
structure, in the service of which Heidegger puts the old word to work as its deconstruction. In
Heidegger's fundamental ontological 'forms' one finds nothing like a structure in any commonly
understood sense, only what would be difference as the hermeneutical 'as', heedful association,
'being underway', producing, project, existing, care, the 'is', temporality, disclosiveness.
In BT, 'What is a Thing' and other writings, Heidegger describes a structure-thing as the bearer of
properties and underlies qualities. A thing is a nucleus around which many changing qualities are
grouped, or a bearer upon which the qualities rest, something that possesses something in itself.
It has an internal organization. But Heidegger doesn't settle for this present to hand account. In a
gesture allied with Derrida, he thinks the structurality of structure as the Being of beings. But he
doesn't do this by conceiving Being via the transitioning through and placing itself into, the
turning toward and away from, structures, forms, schemes. This would be to pre-suppose the
metaphysical concept of structure as present to hand state, and thus leave it unquestioned. It
would not only leave it unquestioned , but confuse ontological-ontic difference with ontic-ontic
difference. What I see Heidegger doing is locating transformation within structure, as Derrida
does in his own way. Heidegger's discussion of propositional statements in BT sec 33 is key here.
In this section he derives the apophantic 'as' structure of propositional logic from the
hermeneutical 'as'.
As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of
propositional statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external
'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as
attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting
care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it
is taken together with it, but not in the manner of a synthesizing relating. Heidegger instead
describes the 'as' as a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the
same time takes apart what has been put together." Transcendence locates itself in this way
within the very heart of the theoretical concept. Simply determining something AS something is
a transforming-performing. It "understands, interprets, and articulates", and thereby "takes apart"
and changes what it affirms by merely pointing at it, by merely having it happen to 'BE' itself.
Heidegger's hermeneutical 'as' functions as Derrida's differential system of signs. Something is
something only as differential . Articulation of the 'is' transforms in order to articulate. That is,
articulation, hinge, IS the 'in order to'. Thus, the problem of the primordial grounding of the 'is',
and the analysis of the logos are the same problem.
Heidegger writes:
"...if the formal characteristics of "relation" and "binding" cannot contribute anything
phenomenally to the factual structural analysis of the logos, the phenomenon intended with the
term copula finally has nothing to do with bond and binding."(BT,p160) "The "is" here speaks
transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in the manner of a transition to beings. But
Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings were first without
Being and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being transits (that), comes
unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that
coming-over." "That differentiation alone grants and holds apart the "between," in which the
overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each
other."(Identity and Difference.p.64)
This is the method of Heidegger's decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. The
thinking of structure as a singularity implies a multiplicity of supposed 'parts' captured in an
instant of time. But the assumption that we think this parallel existence of differences at the
'same time', as the 'same space', organized and centered as a 'THIS', must unravel with the
knowledge that each differential singular is born of and belongs irreducibly to, even as it is a
transformation of, an immediately prior element . Two different elements cannot be presumed to
exist at the same time because each single element is its own time(the hinged time of the pairing
of a passed event with the presencing of a new event) as a change of place. Thus, whenever we
think that we are theorizing two events at the same time, we are unknowingly engaging in a
process of temporal enchainment and spatial recontextualization.
The assumption of a spatial frame depends on the ability to return to a previous element without
the contaminating effect of time. How can we know that elements of meaning are of the same
spatial frame unless each is assumed to refer back to the same 'pre-existing' structure? The same
goes for the fixing of a point of presence as a singular object. This pointing to, and fixing of, an
itself as itself is a thematic centering that brings with it all the metaphysical implications of the
thinking of a structural center. Heidegger's 'as'(which is not a structure in itself but a differential)
explains, derives and deconstructs form, structure, thing before it can ever establish itself as a
'this'.
The issue here centers on the understanding of Heideggerian temporality. Is there a notion of
transformation, transcendence, differentiation, event , performance that doesn't 'take time' but
also avoids being a state, concept, intention, presence, structure? Is it possible to think of such a
notion without inadvertently lapsing into metaphysical totalization? To fail to deconstruct the
concept of structure is to conceive the 'both-together' of past-present-future as a conjunction of
separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the
present object which supplements that past. It is not that these phases are considered as unrelated,
only that they each must are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities in order to
arrive at a notion of stricture-pattern-scheme as an identity. The association between past and
present would be a fracturing, the fracture between Self and Other, between immanence and
transcendence, rather than Heidegger's ecstatic unity. Ontological-Ontic difference is misread as
difference between presences. As the overcoming-arriving difference of Heideggerian
temporality, it is difference WITHIN presence.
Temporality as a 'split' within will, intention, presence is misread if it is thought as smaller bits of
presence. Penetrating the veil of the formal permeating our language of the things within us and
around us is not a matter of discovering smaller, faster, dumber, more interactive 'bits' within the
unities of current approaches, for that would simply displace the issues we've discussed onto a
miniaturized scale. It is a matter of revealing perhaps an entirely different notion of the basis of
entities than that of the freeze-frame state. Being is not an interiority or enclosure(or in between
enclosure and overcoming as the event of their differentiation). On the contrary, it exposes and
subverts the presumed interiority of conceptuality, representation, will from within its own
resources, in the same moment. To read Being and Time starting from the 'is', not as conceptual
binding but as the transit of 'overwhelming and arrival', de-thrones logos, structure, concept and
representation, relegating them to where and how we actually find them in BT, as special derived
modifications of the hermeneutical 'as'.
How are we to do we understand Heidegger's admonitions concerning the dangers of Gestell?
What does one make of those who have not read Heidegger, who have not grasped what he was
aiming at, who battle against what they see as the dangerous 'antiscience' relativisms of
postmodern thinking, who contribute to the universal objectification of being? As Heidegger
points out in Identity and Difference, "the manner in which the matter of
thinking-Being-comports itself, remains a unique state of affairs. The inauthentic modes of the
ready-to-hand, the present-to-hand, average everydayness, authentic Being, Ereignis all mark
different factical experiences. Yet what is common to all possible modes of Being is a certain
radical mobility. This means that there is, every moment , within the thinking of each individual
who participates in the most apparently rigidly schematic orientations, a radical mobility
WITHIN the will to conceptual schematism* that is easy to miss (and in fact has been missed for
most of Western history , according to Heidegger). Even if the effect of this mobility is subtle
enough that it appears for all intents and purposes as though the reign of the dominating
objectivizing scheme were absolute, it is crucial to recognize that even in such situations that
seem to exemplify the a priori neutralization of otherness, a more originary but radically
self-dissimulating a priori, that of Being, is in play, always right now, this instant.
Within and beyond states, forms and structures, lies a universe of barely self-exceeding accents,
modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but
modulations of modulations. The worlds generated from (but never overtaking) this intricate
process may be clumsily described via the terminology of patterned interactions between states,
but at the cost of missing the profound ongoing internal relatedness and immediacy of this
underlying, overflowing movement. Heidegger reveals Being as an interface both more
intrinsically self-transformative and implicatively self-consistent than current views allow for.
The belief in temporary discrete states stifles the intimately interactive potential of their
approaches by making the whole works dependent on irreducible units of formal resistance and
polarization.
Rather than originating in an invasive, displacing outside. of interactions between partially
independent regions, the 'isness' of Being is already articulated as intersections of intersections,
metaphors of metaphors(as metaphoricity itself), guaranteeing that the person as a whole always
functions as an implicatory unity at the very edge of experience. Before there is self or world ,
there would be this single-split gesture, co-implicating continuity and qualitative transformation
in such a way that existing maintains a unity which recognizes itself, at every moment, the 'same
differently'. Aspects hidden within so-called present forms and structures, unique to the
implicative thrust of my own existing, belong to me in a fashion that exceeds my own calculative
grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity. On the contrary, the radically
inseparable interaffecting between my history and new experience exposes me to the world in an
immediate, constant and thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of
my sense of myself and others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via a narrative
conception of socialization.
I am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply person-specific rather than located
intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before there is a pre-reflective personal 'I'
or interpersonal 'we', there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social
site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human
action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings (recent
examples of such intersubjective 'cobbling' include enactive, embodied, embedded accounts put
forth by writers like Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson, which posit
distributed cognition and affect, inter-corporeal co-creation of meaning, participatory
sense-making). Events understood as interaffectings of interaffectings, working within and
beyond relations among presumed temporary essences (conceptual, affective-bodily,
interpersonal), do not achieve their gentle integrative continuity through any positive internal
power. On the contrary, they simply lack the formidability of static identity necessary to impose
the arbitrariness of conditioning, mapping, mirroring, grafting and cobbling, on the movement of
experiential process.
Most readings of Heidegger (Gadamer, Levinas, Evan Thompson) view the mutual carrying out
and trans-formative nature of beings-being as implying, including, and carrying along with it
rather than erasing the internal composition of a structure of a being-to-be-modified. Being for
them is substance and movement . Being is nature itself as the transformative substance and
movement that goes across and beyond formation. Being is the 'in between' the subjective
conditioning of the object and the objective conditioning of the subject. So the array of elements
that are organized and thought together, at once, thematically as this structure-form are carried
into their trans-formation(we could also say trans-structuration). But I have argued here that the
purpose of Heidegger's investigation of propositionality is not to identify theoretical objects as
ontological givens for Being, but to establish propositional object, concept, representation,
Gestell, as ontic existents in order to reveal them more rigorously as grounded ontologically (in
the sense of fundamental ontology) in primordial unconcealment. Most readings of Heidegger do
the reverse, attempting to ground fundamental ontology, and all of the modal analyses which
spring from it, in what for Heidegger is the ontic plane of propositional representation. In other
words, they reduce the ontological difference to a difference between two ontic determinations.
Being conceived as the performative difference between schematism and existence is a difference
between two ontic determinations and therefore is itself on the ontic plane of propositionality. It
is a present to hand thinking masquerading as post-metaphysical.
When one begins from the subjectivism of representationality, the way of out of Kantian a
priorism must stand as the absolute other to representation; that is to say, it must arrive in the
guise of the performance of the differentiation between Subjective structuring and Objective
determination. Only in this way can the empirically conditioned and contingent beginning of
thought avoid being mistaken for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Even the
radicality of Deleuzian difference begins from a thinking of structure-state as irreducible.
Heidegger and Derrida give us a way to avoid grounding fundamental ontology in the
performative difference between schematism and existence as its condition of possibility.
Gendlin and Heidegger on Logic, Proposition, Concept, Pattern:
The greatest challenge to philosophical thinking today is to become aware of how deeply
entrenched traditional notions of logic remain, in the extent to which they still govern approaches
from Nietzsche and Gadamer to Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. In recognition of the daunting task
of dismantling the metaphysics of propositional thinking, Heidegger spoke of the necessity, in a
confrontation with the tradition, to "revolutionarily shake up the notion of logic" from the ground
up (Logic as the Question concerning the Essence of Language).
As an illustration of the difficulty of achieving a revolution in our thinking of logic, I want to
bring the work of Eugene Gendlin into the discussion. Drawing from diverse influences spanning
hermeneutics, existentialism, pragmatism and phenomenology, Gendlin has submitted the
problematic of structure-state-pattern to a fundamental questioning that nearly approaches the
radicality of Heidegger and Derrida in its situating the genesis of meaning-making in an
always-already self-temporalizing interaffecting whose unfolding precedes and overflows any
notion of state or form.
Reminiscent of Heidegger's analysis of propositional statements, Gendlin writes concerning
structurality "The notion of an imposed order splits everything into two sides: The order is
considered as if it were independent. On the other side there is something passive and unordered,
upon which order is imposed, something that does not feed back, because it has no order of its
own." The essence of a pattern for Gendlin is the self-identicality of representation.
"An imposed order is the sort of order that can be the same, here or there, so that it does not
depend on what it is imposed upon. The very notion of "order" has come to mean the sort that
can be imposed, that is to say it is assumed to function like a pattern. An order that can be
imposed is inherently abstract, since it is the same in many places. So it is independent of the
places and can omit everything that does not fit it. Therefore it can be put on something that did
not have it from itself. Such an order seems to work alone." (Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body,
Language, and Situations).
So far Gendlin's idea of form, pattern and rule as cutting itself off from its meaning-giving
context of relevance jibes with Heidegger's notion of statement as a limiting derivative
modification of primordial ontological interpretation. But Gendlin stops short of deriving logical
form from his generative implicit order. Whereas for both Heidegger and Gendlin logical forms
derive their originating meaning from a framing context (circumspection, attunement and the
ready to hand for Heidegger, the bodily implicit order for Gendlin), the former's forms and
patterns are irreducibly primordial in their internal structure, prior to their enbeddedness in a
larger implicit order. Gendlin's wider implict order doesn't reveal the perceived self-identicality
of his distinctions, forms, grids, patterns, schemes, categories to be a distortion or covering over
of a more fundamental meaning-making, but instead reifies them by having them function
alongside and feeding back into that wider, more intricate order. Gendlin says
"Rules and forms are always at work; they are implicit in all our situations and our bodily
experience - how we interact, eat, sleep, feel, and perceive. If there is a bodily order, we will see
it functioning with, not without them.""Much of our living needs to be done within steady
existing forms. But it is important to know that this intricacy is always there. At certain junctures
it is vital to let it function."""[Implicit intricacy] is more demanding than logic. The working,
changing, and coming of words is a function not just of extant forms but also of the implicit
intricacy"(Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Language, and Situations). "We need to go back and
forth between logic and bodily-felt understanding. They build upon each other. It would be
wrong to make an ideology of lauding one and pretending to do without the other."...patterns
work-in another, more intricate order which talks back..."(The Time of the Explicating Process:
A Comment on Thomas Fuchs' "Body Memory").
"To study the role played by implicit understanding in the coming of new concepts will not
undermine the concepts we already have. Those concepts work explicitly, with logical
implications. Logic is their own power for precise consequences. To use their power we must let
them work as if they were alone, without us. Logical inference requires that we don't let anything
upset the concepts. For example, while calculating our bank account we don't double one deposit
because it came from a special source. All our technology depends on logical inference. Seven
billion of us couldn't all live on the planet without it. To undermine logic and explicit concepts is
not sensible. Of course we know that we operate the concepts. How they work 'alone' is
something we let them do. This isn't very puzzling.
Whatever else concepts are, they are tools. For example, a screwdriver must be allowed to keep
its own narrow head, and to engage the screw with it. We are holding it, of course, but the
screwdriver's own pattern turns the screw. Obviously, more complex machines produce their own
results. Concepts similarly have their own logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly
involved in the coming and having of concepts. We keep the system of existing concepts
inviolate and separate. Then we can also have a second system in which we study how something
implicit works in the coming of new concepts. We will be concerned throughout with the
necessary separation, contrast, and relationship between the system of explicitly formed concepts
and our second system about how something functions implicitly. Far from being in conflict, this
article will show that if the two systems stay separate, they expand each other
reciprocally."(What First and Third Person Processes Really Are).
Would Heidegger agree that concepts are tools that consist in their 'own' patterns and logical
inferences, 'quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of
concepts'(Gendlin 2009)? The point for Heidegger would be that this apparent apartness of
explicit logic from implicit experience is a kind of distortion of primordial Dasein's interpretive
signification. Contrary to the 'precise consequences' Gendlin lauds in logical calculation,
Heidegger says "the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in
principle the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more exact than
historiographical, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations
relevant to it."
"The first, constant, and last task [of primordial understanding] is not to let fore-having,
fore-sight, and fore-conception be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to
guarantee the scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves."
Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's concept of logos would seem to apply to Gendlin's distinctions
and patterns. "Aristotle had a more radical view [than Plato]; every logos is synthesis and
diairesis at the same time, not either the one-say, as a "positive judgment"-or the other-as a
"negative judgment." Rather, every statement, whether affirmative or negative, whether false or
true, is equiprimordially synthesis and diairesis. Pointing out is putting together and taking apart.
However, Aristotle did not pursue this analytical question further to a problem: what
phenomenon is it then within the structure of the logos that allows and requires us to characterize
every statement as synthesis and diairesis? What is to be got at phenomenally with the formal
structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the two, is the
phenomenon of "something as something."
In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something else, it is
taken together with it, so that this confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, at the
same time takes apart what has been put together. If the phenomenon of the "as" is covered over
and above all veiled in its existential origin from the hermeneutical "as," Aristotle's
phenomenological point of departure disintegrates to the analysis of logos in an external "theory
of judgment," according to which judgment is a binding or separating of representations and
concepts. Thus binding and separating can be further formalized to mean a "relating."
Logistically, the judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations," it becomes the object of
"calculation," but not a theme of ontological interpretation." "If the kind of being of the terms of
the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the
relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things."(BT
206)
"In the first and authentic instance, this "as" is not the "as" of predication qua predication but is
prior to it in such a way that it makes possible the very structure of predication at all. Predication
has the as-structure, but in a derived way, and it has it only because the as-structure is predication
within a [wider] experience. But why is it that this as-structure is already present in a direct act of
dealing with something? The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and
take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is
always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as,
but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act. The non-explicitness
of this "as" is precisely what constitutes the act's so-called directness. Yes, the thing that is
understood can be apprehended directly as it is in itself. But this directness regarding the thing
apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure. Moreover, what is
structural and necessary in the act of [direct] understanding need not be found, or
co-apprehended, or expressly named in the thing understood.
I repeat: The [primary] as-structure does not belong to something thematically understood. It
certainly can be understood, but not directly in the process of focally understanding a table, a
chair, or the like. Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it "as
something," are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the "as"
requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. Understanding something
without the "as"-in a pure sensation, for example-can be carried out only "reductively," by
"pulling back" from an as-structured experience. And we must say: far from being primordial, we
have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most important, such an experience is per se
possible only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only within an
as-structured experience and by prescinding from the "as"- which is the same as admitting that
as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from." (Logic,
The Question of Truth,p.122).
The minute one considers something like a form or distinction as a capacity to impose 'itself' on
something or someone else, one is assuming calculability, representationalism and self-identical
repetition. If, instead, a distinction always already distinguishes itself from what it relates itself to
as a new 'this way' of relevant relating, then it would never have the chance to simply impose
itself; it would always be itself as a new relevant distinction.
In Gendlin's example of the screwdriver's 'own logical pattern' turning the screw, the shape of a
screwdriver's head may be understood in any variety of ways, but each possible account is
understood primordially for Heidegger as a unique and particular relevant sense in relation to
one's current involvements, via the hermeneutical 'as' structure. This is also true of the screw and
its relationship with the screwdriver head, in terms of the precision of fit between the two or any
other respect that is encountered in relation to our concernful dealings with screwdriver and
screw as tools .
Most of the examples of logical patterns that Gendlin mentions in his writings involve public
language rather than calculative machines, and as we saw with the use of screwdriver and screw,
Gendlin posits an independence of logical relationships from his underlying implicit generating
process. The former feed back into, but are not derived from the latter. Language concepts have
"their own logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and
having of concepts", Heidegger refers to such public language in terms of the average
everydayness of idle talk. He says "We encounter the vagueness and vacuity of meanings, which
are not in fact grasped as meanings, in the way everyday talk pursues its themes. This
impoverished ontological structure of the said and the talk that is governed by it must not prompt
us to view language as a matter of tone or sound in the first instance. The vagueness of meaning
is a specific quality, namely the routinized intelligibility of well-worn everyday talk....it may also
pervade and govern the treatment of problems within scientific disciplines."(The Concept of
Time 1924)." For Heidegger everyday communication can only be taken as an impoverished
leveling down of primordial understanding precisely because the very basis of language is the
primordiality of the hermeneutical 'as' structure. Thus, contrary to Gendlin, there is nothing about
the logical functioning of language , or of tool use in general , that is independent of this
generating impetus. We don't go back and forth between logic and bodily-felt understanding as
independent systems of meaning. Rather, logic, as the derived modality of the present-to-hand,
never departs from the fundamental dynamics of Being as attuned, discursive temporality.
In conclusion, Gendlin's struggle to jettison the remnants of the metaphysical foundations of
logic led him to a compromise between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. He had taken a step
beyond discourses of intersubjective cobbling, such as that of enactive, embodied extended
cognitive theorists and Deleuzian bio-politics, by rethinking their arbitrary inter-relational
schematics more fundamentally as the implicit intricacy of bodily intraffectimg. Yet, rather than
grounding logical forms, structures and states in this interaffecting, he left the basis of logic
undeconstructed, thereby forcing his generating process to accommodate itself to and operate
alongside rules and forms.
*The will never has a grasp of itself that is not a being beyond itself. When we think of intention
as grasping toward objects, we don't see the underlying alterity that always makes desire want
otherwise than what it wants in the very instant of desiring. Desire is only a willing of what it
wills if thought of as a being-for-itself, auto-affection, the contingent self-identicality of the
moment of a program. Intention-will-desire must be thought this way as long as it thinks itself
grounded via structure, form, and state. Only when thought in this way does the problem arise of
extricating ourselves from the temporary solipsism of the event (We MUST keep reason in play).
Heidegger's critique of Will to Power, as I see it, faults Nietzsche for not departing radically
enough from a Levinasian thinking of intentionality as the 'grasp of the Will'.
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